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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
DAVID E. ALEXANDER, being first duly sworn upon oath, and based upon his own 
personal knowledge, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am counsel of record for the Defendants herein and participated in the entire trial 
of this matter. 
2. That during Plaintiffs counsel's closing arguments, he made improper arguments 
which invited the jury to decide the case contrary to the law, evidence and the pleading. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 1 
415 
3. In particular, during his closing argument, Plaintiff focused on matters previously 
rejected by this Court. Namely, that Mr. Rammell only contributed $500 to become a 50% member 
of CBI, that the jury should find fraud regarding the will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed 
contract with the Rutter Group. 
4. Opposing counsel also made arguments to the jury not based on evidence presented 
at trial, in that the Defendants defrauded ABI because if April died ABI would be worth nothing. 
5. Opposing counsel further inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters. 
6. All of which tainted every claim before the jury and urged them to find fraud without 
any basis in the pleadings, evidence or in the law and, instead, based on passion and prejudice. 
7. The Court erred in submitting jury instructions and a verdict form which, 
a. permitted the jury to find liability in gross against all of the Defendants for 
discrete acts of fraud allegedly committed by individual Defendants; 
b. permitted the jury to assign damages in gross on discrete fraud claims for 
each of which the Plaintiff was required by law to plead and prove with clear 
and convincing evidence the damages resulting therefrom; 
c. confused the jury and permitted it to find fraud and breach and award 
damages on matters not properly submitted to it, including but not limited to 
claims related to the will of Christa Beguesse Rammell; and 
d. confused the jury with respect to the Defendant's Counterclaim. 
8. This affidavit is made in support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the alternative, for a New Trial. 
FURTHER SAITH THE AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 2 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
~ 
On this~~ day of April, 2012, before me, a Notary Public for the State ofldaho, personally 
appeared DAVID E. ALEXANDER, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this 
Certificate first above written. 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day~ 12, I served a true, correct and copy 
of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL- 4 
fr U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
t ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
)k[Yacsimile (208) 529-9732 
418 
W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-61 09 
VILLE COWHY.IDAh"-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 







KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 
personal representative, Kenneth ) 
Rammel!. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) ____________________________ ) 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENTNOTI\t1THSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually, ("Mr. Rammell") and 
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, ("the Estate") 
and CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, ("CBI") by and through their attorney of 
record, David E. Alexander, and hereby submit their Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative, their 
Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This Motion is 
supported by Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 1 419 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the alternative, for a New Trial, along with the Affidavit of 
Counsel filed herein. sf!: 
Dated this '2!_ day of April, 2012 
RA.CINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BA EY, CHARTE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. }j_!;/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t~y of April, 2010, I served a true, correct and 
copy of the above and foregoing document upon the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. A vondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
1>( U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL -Page 2 420 
W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 







KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, ) 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation, ESTATE OF CHRISTA ) 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by its qualified ) 




Case No. CV -09-2767 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
COME NOW the Defendants, KENNETH RAMMELL individually, ("Mr. Rammell") and 
as personal representative of the ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE RAMMELL, ("the Estate") 
and CHRIST A BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho corporation, ("CBI") by and through their attorney of 
record, David E. Alexander, and hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or in the alternative, their Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to Rule 59 ofthe Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as follows. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants contend that this Court should enter a judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative, order 
a new trial based on, but limited to, the following: 
1. The damages assessed against Defendants were excessive and appeared to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice; 
2. The evidence was insufficient to justifY the verdicts and awards made in favor of the 
Plaintiff; 
3. The verdicts and awards made in favor of the Plaintiff were contrary to the law; 
4. The Court erred in submitting jury instructions and a verdict form which, 
a. permitted the jury to find liability in gross against all of the Defendants for 
discrete acts of fraud allegedly committed by individual Defendants; 
b. permitted the jury to assign damages in gross on discrete fraud claims for 
each of which the Plaintiff was required by law to plead and prove with clear 
and convincing evidence the damages resulting therefrom; 
c. confused the jury and permitted it to find fraud and breach and award 
damages on matters not properly submitted to it, including but not limited to 
claims related to the will of Christa Beguesse Rammell; and 
d. confused the jury with respect to the Defendant's Counterclaim; 
5. The Court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for a Directed Verdict; 
6. The Court erred in submitting Plaintiffs fraud claims to the jury; 
7. Plaintiffs counsel made improper arguments which invited the jury to decide the case 
contrary to the law. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 2 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Rule 50(b) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than 
fourteen ( 14) days after entry of the judgment and may be made whether or not the 
party moved for a directed verdict .... A motion for a new trial may be joined with 
this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative, in conformance with 
the requirements of Rule 59( a); and a motion to set aside or otherwise nullifY a 
verdict or for a new trial shall be deemed to include this motion as an alternative .... 
"A motion for judgment n.o.v. based on I.R.C.P. 50(b) is treated as simply a delayed motion 
for a directed verdict and the standard for both is the same." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 
727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). A judgment n.o.v. "can be used by the district court to correct its error 
in denying a directed verdict." Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474, 478-479, 797 P.2d 1322, 1327 
(1990). The central question on review in a judgment n.o.v. is whether, after viewing the evidence 
in light most favorable to the non-moving party, "the evidence is of sufficient quantity and probative 
value that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the jury." Smith v. Praegitzer, 
113 Idaho 887, 890, 749 P.2d 1012, 1015 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). "A judgment n.o.v. should be 
granted when there is no substantial competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury" (Brand 
S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,732-733,639 P.2d 429,430 (1981)) and when there is "but one 
conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached" (Be co Constr. Co. v. Harper 
Contr., 130 Idaho 4, 8, 936 P .2d 202,206 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997)( citing Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 
P .2d at 1192). Rule 50(b) is intended to give "the trial court the last opportunity to order the 
judgment that the law requires." Quick, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. 
"If an alternative motion for new trial is made with the j.n.o.v. motion, the trial court must 
rule on both motions separately." Beco Constr. Co. v. Harper Contr., 130 Idaho 4, 8, 936 P.2d 202, 
206 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997). The standard of review on a motion for a new trial is different than that 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 3 423 
for a motion for a judgment n.o.v. Under Rule 59( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues 
in an action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings ofthe court, jury or adverse party or any order of 
the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a 
fair trial. 
2. Misconduct of the jury. 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which 
the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial. 
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justifY the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against the law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new trial based upon any of 
the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be accompanied by an affidavit 
stating in detail the facts relied upon in support of such motion for a new triaL Any 
motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefor with 
particularity. On a motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and 
direct the entry of a new judgment. 
When determining whether to grant a new trial, the court is not bound by the substantial 
evidence standard as it is in the judgment n.o.v. context. BrandS Corp., 102 Idaho at 733,639 P.2d 
at 431. Additionally, the court is "not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable" to the 
non-moving party. Nations v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, 113 Idaho 568,572,746 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). Rather, "unlike a motion for a directed verdict orjudgrnentn.o.v., 
the trial court has broad discretion to weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, and it may 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 4 
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set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation of the evidence, even though there is 
substantial evidence to support the verdict." Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416,422, 835 P.2d 651, 
657 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). Plaintiff's claims fail whether analyzed under the judgment n.o.v. 
standard or the new trial standard. 
ANALYSIS 
I. ALL OF ABI'S CLAIMS lVIUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 
A. ABI's Claims Are Not Ripe and It Failed to Demonstrate Any Damages 
ABI's claims must fail because it did not present any substantial evidence of damages. 
Without any damages, ABI' s claims are not ripe. Even if they are ripe, absent any showing of 
damages, all of ABI's claims must fail against all Defendants. 
"The traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to prove 1) that the case 
presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and substantial controversy exists, and 3) that 
there is a present need for adjudication." Noh v. Cenarrusa (in Re Action to Determine 
Constitutionality of Indian Gaming Initiative), 137 Idaho 798, 801, 53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002). "A 
justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract 
character; from one that is academic or moot." Wylie v. State, 253 P.3d 700,705 (Idaho 2011)( citing 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd ofEduc., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 
P.2d 644,649-50 (1996)). 
In Noh v. Cenarrusa, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "there [was] not a real controversy 
at this point because Proposition One is simply a proposal. It has not become a law. There is no 
present need for adjudication. If Proposition One does not pass, there will not be a need for an 
adjudication as to its validity. This case does not meet the elements of the traditional ripeness test." 
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Noh, 137 Idaho at 801, 53 P.3d at 1220. 
In the fraud context, "fraud alone, without damage, is not actionable, nor is damage without 
fraud, but when the two concur, an action lies. The party seeking damages or relief on the ground 
of a false representation must show that he has been damaged or prejudiced because of it." Cooper 
v. Wesco Builders, 76 Idaho 278,284,281 P .2d 669, 672-673 (1955) (citing 32 A.L.R.2d 226, Fraud, 
§ 23; 37 C.J.S., Fraud,§ 103, pp. 408-409) (internal citations omitted); see also 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud 
and Deceit§ 272. Additionally, "there is no damage where the position of the complaining party is 
no worse than it would be had the alleged fraud not been committed." !d. (citing 23 Am.Jur. 994, 
Fraud and Deceit,§ 175). Finally, "damages must also be certain, ... such as can clearly be defined 
and ascertained." Id (citing 23 Am.Jur. 995, Fraud and Deceit,§ 176). 
The law pertaining to damages as outline above applies with the same force in the breach of 
contract and warranty context. The burden is "upon a plaintiff in a breach of contract case to prove 
not only that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount 
and causation must be proven with reasonable certainty." Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 2012 Ida. 
LEXIS 63 (March 2, 2012) (citing Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 
604, 611 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, April contended at trial that ABI had been damaged because she could not sell the 
business. There was absolutely no proof at trial that April could not sell the business. April admitted 
that she has never actually attempted to sell the business. In fact, the only evidence at trial was that 
Linda Diamond-Raznick told April that she could sell ABI with Ms. Diamond-Raznick' s permission, 
just as April's mother and CBI had done in with April. Thus, like the claimant in Noh v. Cenarrusa, 
ABI' s claim for damages is purely speculative and is not ripe as ABI has not suffered any damages. 
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Furthermore, April failed to demonstrate any reason ABI is worse off now than it would be 
had the alleged fraud and breaches not been committed. April claimed that business was only worth 
$250,000 when she bought in 2003, notwithstanding that ABI has made approximately $3 million 
in gross revenues since 2003. April vaguely contended that she understood the Defendants to 
represent that the business owned files worth more than a million dollars. April failed to testifY of 
any actual misrepresentations made by any Defendant as to the value of the business to ABI. Even 
if it can be somehow construed that the Defendants did testifY concerning the business's worth, it 
is well settled that representations as to value of property are by their nature opinions, not statements 
of fact, and therefore cannot be considered warranties nor actionable representations of fact. See 
Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553,556 (1886); Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1924); 
Fisherv. Davidhizar, 2011 Utah App. 270,263 P.3d 440,447 (2011); and 37 Am Jur 2d Fraud and 
Deceit§ 173 (2012). 
As a result, all of ABI' s remaining claims against all Defendants must fail because the matter 
is not ripe and there is no substantial competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury as a 
matter of law. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 50(b). 
In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, 
must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). The jury's award of damages is excessive and appeared to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. There is insufficient evidence to justifY the 
verdict and such was against and in error ofthe law. 
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B. The Statue of Limitations Bars ABI's Fraud and Breach Claims 
ABI's fraud and breach of contract and warranty claims against all Defendants must fail 
because they are barred by the statute of limitations. As to fraud claims, 
A three-year statute of limitation for fraud is established by I.C. § 5-218(4). The 
statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have 
known of the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 
360 (1991). Application ofl.C. § 5-218(4) does not depend on when the plaintiff 
should have been aware that something was wrong; as used in the statute, "discovery" 
means the point in time when the plaintiff had actual or constructive knowledge of 
the facts constituting the fraud. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 773, 820 P.2d at 368. Actual 
knowledge will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could have discovered the 
fraud by the exercise of due diligence. 
McCorkle v. NorthwesternMut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550,554-555, 112 P.3d 838,842-843 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2005). 
As to breach of an oral contract and oral warranty claims, according Idaho Code § 5-217, an 
action upon an oral contract, obligation or liability must be brought within four years. According to 
Idaho Code § 28-2-725, 
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four ( 4) 
years after the cause of action has accrued .... 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved 
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of 
delivery is made .... 1 
Whether under Idaho Code§ 5-217 or § 28-2-725, "the statute oflimitations begins to run 
at the time the cause of action accrues." (Memorandum Decision, datedNovember2, 201 O,page 14). 
ABI filed suit on May 8, 2009. In order to survive against the statute oflimitations, ABI 
must prove that April did not discover the alleged facts constituting fraud at least until Mary 8, 2006 
1 See page 14 ofthe Court's Memorandum Decision, dated November 2, 2010 for 
applicability ofidaho Code § 28-2-725. 
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and at least until May 8, 2005 on the breach of contract and warrant claims. 
i. All Claims Regarding Library of Files Are Barred 
April's story fails the smell test. April admitted that she knew that niether ABI nor CBI ever 
owned the copyrights to the library of files. Thus, April and ABI always knew it did not own the 
library of files it later claims she thought she owned. As a matter oflaw, the statute oflimitations 
bars Plaintiff's fraud and breach of contract claims regarding the library of files. 
ii. All Claims Regarding PageMaker Are Barred 
She further testified that her mother told people at the Exchange Group that she had not 
invented the software sometime in 2003, which fact was confirmed by Steven Hall during the trial. 
(ABI depo 84-85). April also admitted that she discovered that the proprietary software she had been 
promised turned out to be a manipulated version of Adobe PageMaker when she installed a new 
version ofPageMaker approximately four or five years prior to her December 17, 2009 Rule 30(b )( 6) 
deposition. (ABI depo 22, 83-84). By her own admissions, April discovered or should have 
discovered the facts constituting the alleged fraud well before May 8, 2006. ABI's fraud claims fail. 
Likewise, ABI' s breach of contract and warranty claims must also fail. According to Idaho 
Code§ 28-2-725 and§ 5-217, this is true regardless of when ABI or April's actually discovered that 
CBI never owned proprietary software. Her cause of action accrued when the breach allegedly 
occurred in 200, when the business was sold to ABI. 
As a matter of law, the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff's fraud and breach of contract 
claims regarding the proprietary files. 
iii. All Other Claims, If Any, Are Barred 
April testified that she had worked for CBI in highschool, in college and throughout her life, 
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including in 2001 and 2002, prior taking over the company in 2003. She testified that she was 
involved in all details of the company's operations and acted as president ofCBI for all of2003 and 
thereafter. April has over 35 years of experience working in the printing and typesetting industry. 
Overall, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that April know or should have known 
through reasonable investigations, that ABI did not own the library of files or propriety PageMaker 
software or any other basis for her fraud and breach claims, well before Mary 8, 2006 and May 8, 
2005. All of ABI's remaining fraud and breach of contract and warranty claims against all 
Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code§§ 5-218(4) and 28-2-725, 
respectively. There simply is no substantial and competent evidence to rule otherwise. This Court 
should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b ). In the alternative, 
this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict 
based up on its independent evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), (5), (6) 
and (7). The jury's failure to bar ABI's claims by virtue of the statute of limitations is not justified 
by the evidence to justify the verdict and was against and in error of the law. 
C. Opposing Counsel's Inappropriate Arguments 
Plaintiff's closing argument focused on matters previously rejected by this Court. Namely, 
that Mr. Rammell only contributed $500 to become a 50% member ofCBI, that the jury should find 
fraud regarding the will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group. 
Opposing counsel also made arguments to the jury not based on evidence presented at trial, in that 
the Defendants defrauded ABI because if April died ABI would be worth nothing. Opposing counsel 
further inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters. All of which tainted every claim before the 
jury and urged them to find fraud without any basis in the pleadings, evidence or in the law and, 
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instead, based on passion and prejudice. 
II. ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 
"The correctness of jury instructions 'is a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free 
review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have been 
given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."' Craig Johnson Constr., L.L. C. 
v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797,800, 134 P.3d 648,651 (2006). "Where prejudicial 
errors of law have occurred, however, the district court has a duty to grant a new trial under Rule 
59( a)(7), even though the verdict is supported by substantial and competent evidence." !d. at 801, 
at 652. 
A. Improper Verdict Form 
It is impossible to detetmine, when reviewing the verdict form, what specific acts of fraud 
the jury found that Mr. Rammell, CBI or the Estate committed. Without knowing who committed 
what fraud, the jury could have reach of verdict based on evidence that was not substantial or 
competent. There award could have been the product ofirrelevant evidence and evidence supporting 
claims that were later dismissed, including the guaranteed contract, Mr. Rammell being a 50% 
shareholder of the CBI, and the existence of a will, all combined with the confusing limiting 
instruction made pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-202 and Rule 601 (b) ofthe Idal1o Rules of Evidence. 
Furthermore, if the Court throws out one fraud claim based on this motion, it must set a new trial on 
all remaining fraud claims because there is no way of telling what grounds the jury based it is verdict 
on. 
B. Improper Jury Instructions 
The jury was allowed to consider fraud on the basis of "misrepresentations as to the terms 
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of the contract." One cannot, while negotiating a contract, "misrepresent" the terms ofthe contract. 
A term is either agreed to or it is not. The instructions, by simply giving the jury a blanket fraud 
instruction, permitted the jury to find fraud on this ground. Furthermore, the jury instructions were 
confusing to the jury and permitted them to find fraud with regard to one alleged misstatement but 
award damages for others. 
C. The Amount of Damages Award by Jury Are Not Supported by Evidence 
The evidence presented at trial did not support the damages awarded by the jury. For fraud, 
the jury awarded as damages a number that finds no support in any evidence of damages. Rather, the 
amount awarded is exactly one-half of the value ofthe community property as it appears in the notes 
of attorney Stephen Martin. This indicates that the jury awarded damages for fraud related to the will, 
which was not proper. The jury in essence turned this trial into a retrial of the will challenge in 
probate court. 
Overall, this Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on all counts of fraud pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses, must set aside the verdict based up on its independent evaluation and order a new trial 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). It is clear that the jury reached its verdict based on 
confusion, prejudice and passion. 
III. ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST THE ESTATE FOR A LACK OF 
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
ABI's fraud claims against the Estate must fail because there was no evidence to sustain a 
finding of fraud against the Estate. The only evidence of statements of fact made by Christa to the 
Plaintiff carne from the Plaintiff. Pursuant to the Court's ruling on Defendant's objection pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 9-202 and Rule 60 I (b) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the Court's limiting 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERt'IA TIVE FOR NEW TRIAL- Page 12 
instruction, the Plaintiff's testimony cannot be used to establish fraud against the Estate. 
The only evidence other than Plaintiff's testimony came from attorney Stephen Martin. That 
evidence, consisting of Christa's alleged representation as to the market value of her business in 
1999 in the event of her death, was not a statement of fact but of opinion as to the market value of 
the company in the event ofliquidation as part of the estate. There was no evidence that the figure 
represented any individual's valuation of the company as a going concern or a valuation placed on 
the business by the parties to the contract made five years later. It is not material to prove that the 
later valuation was fraudulent. Besides, the statement was made to Mr. Martin, not to the Plaintiff. 
In any event, it is well settled that representations as to value of property are by their nature 
opinions, not statements of fact, and therefore cannot be considered warranties nor actionable 
representations offact. Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553,556 (1886); Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 
F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1924); Fisher v. Davidhizar, 2011 Utah App. 270,263 P.3d 440,447 (2011). 
This single piece of evidence fails to meet even one of the elements of fraud. Accordingly, the fraud 
claims against the Estate must be dismissed for lack of competent evidence. 
ABI's fraud claims against the Estate must fail for a lack of substantial and competent 
evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on its fraud claims pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order a new trial 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). 
IV. ABI'S FRAUD CLAIMS MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FOR 
FAILURE TO PROVE ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRAUD 
ABI has failed to prove any and all the elements of fraud against all Defendants. "To 
successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the following 
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elements: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; ( 4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's 
ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) 
resultant injury." Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931 (2007). All nine elements must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence. Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 250 
(2010). 
Based on this Court's rulings the only remammg allegedly fraudulent 
representations/omissions made by Mr. Rammell, Christa and CBI to April for the jury to decide, 
are the following: 
• 
• 
that CBI owned a library of proprietary titles valued at over $1,000,000 . 
hat CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business . 
• that Christa has a will that allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon 
Christa's death. 
First and form most, April's testimony at trial was vague as to who made what 
representations as to what. Like the verdict form, it is impossible to determine who is liable for 
which representations. Thus, having failed to show by clear and convincing evidence who 
specifically represented what, it is contrary to justice to hold any of the Defendants liable for any of 
the alleged fraudulent representations/omissions. 
A. Representations Regarding Ownership of Library of Files and Their Value 
ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' representation 
to ABI that CBI owned a ceratin library of titles and their value. April admitted at trial that she knew 
prior to purchasing CBI that CBI did not own the copyrights to the titles. She also admitted that, 
without owning the copyrights, ABI could not sell the titles. Such admissions struck a deadly blow 
to her fraud claim regarding the ownership of the library of files and should have prevented it from 
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going to the jury. Such was a reversible error. 
April's claim is like a person who, after having raised horses all her life, decides to purchase 
a horse from another horse dealer, and then later claims that she thought she was buying a unicorn. 
Unicorns don't exist. Neither did CBI's ownership of any copyrights pertaining to the library of 
files. April knew that and admitted knowing that prior to purchasing CBI. She worked for mother 
is years past and spent her life in the typesetting and printing business. Regardless of the files 
alleged value, the Plaintiff cannot claim the right to sell something she knew she didn't own and 
couldn't sell. Such is irrational and unactionable and should never have gone to the jury. 
ABI knew or should have known that the Defendants' alleged representations were false. 
B. Representations Regarding PageMaker 
ABI has failed to show that it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendant's representation 
to ABI that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software. On page II, of its Memorandum Decision 
and Order, dated November 2, 20I 0, this Court stated, "Whether the software used in the business 
was proprietary or available to the public would reasonably have an effect on the purchase price of 
the business." April repeatedly testified at trial that anyone could buy PageMaker (for $600) off the 
shelf and that April had used PageMaker throughout her career. ABI knew or should have known 
that the Defendants' alleged representations were false. 
ABI also has failed to show that it relied and/or justifiably relied on the Defendants' 
representations to ABI regarding the proprietary software. 
In particular, April repeatedly testified that Mr. Rammell knew nothing about typesetting. 
Mr. Rammell agreed. His background was in accounting and his limited involvement in CBI was 
in preparing financial and tax information approximately one day a month. When ask what was Mr. 
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Rammell' s involvement in CBI, April stated, "Not a thing." When ask which of Mr. Rammell' s 
representations ABI relied on in purchasing CBI, April stated, "Not one iota." Although April later 
stated that Mr. Rammell had concurred with Christa's alleged representations, it is clear that ABI 
did not rely on Mr. Rammell' s representations regarding PageMaker (or the library of titles or their 
value). By all accounts, he knew nothing about those things. No reasonable juror could find 
otherwise. 
C. Representations Regarding The Existence of Christa's Will Allowing ABI to 
Cease Payments to CBI Upon Christa's Death 
ABI has failed to show that the Defendants' representation were false regarding the existence 
of Christa's will that allowed her to stop making payments to CBI upon Christa's death. The 
Plaintiff simply failed to get any of the terms of the will into evidence during trial to show whether 
it allowed her to stop making payments or not. Plaintiff's fraud claim in this regard fails as a matter 
of law. The issue never should have gone to the jury. Doing so allowed opposing counsel to urge 
the jury to to "rewrite" Christa's will. Such was a reversible error. 
Overall, all of ABI's fraud claims against all Defendants must fail for a lack of substantial 
and competent evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against ABI on its fraud claims 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing the evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent evaluation and order 
a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7). 
V. ABI'S FRAUD AND BREACH CLAIMS REGARDING THE LIBRARY OF 
FILES MUST FAIL AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS 
A. Claim Precluded by Prior Summary Judgment 
In 201 0, the Court granted summary judgment for the Defendants on Plaintiff's claim that 
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she was defrauded into believing she would have a "guaranteed contract" with the customer. The 
"guaranteed contract," as the Plaintiff described her understanding of it in her Rule 30(b)(6) 
deposition, was that ownership of the library of proprietary files gave her control over the customer's 
choice of who to use for typesetting services. She testified she understood that there was no written 
or verbal contract with the Rutter Group. She testified she understood that Rutter and CBI "were 
locked kind of into each other because Christa owned these files (the working typesetting files) and 
ifthe Rutter Group wanted them back they would have to pay Christa for them." (ABI depo 53-54) 
April understood that there was no enforceable written contract between CBI and the Rutter Group 
which required Rutter to do business with CBI; it was just that Christa owned those files and Rutter 
had no better choice. (ABI depo 56) She understood it was not a contract, but an "understanding" 
between Rutter and CBI. (ABI depo 97) She admitted that CBI never told her that The Rutter Group 
was obligated to do business with her. (ABI depo 51) She explained in detail in her deposition: 
Q. . .. What I would like to know now is to the best of your memory right now what was 
represented to you about a guaranteed contract? How was that described to you? 
A. It was described to me that 
Q. Bywhom? 
A. Christa and Ken both. We were around the kitchen table. That the Rutter Group 
library was owned by Christa Beguesse, Incorporated. And because of that there was 
a binding- a contractual obligation for the Rutter Group to continue to use Christa 
and vice versa. It would be vastly too much money and time for them to ever try to 
reinvent that type of wheel. It was 30 years in the making. And, again, for the meager 
fee of $12,000 a month I could buy these files. And then, like I said, turn around and 
sell them either back to the Rutter Group or to a third party. 
Q. That was your guaranteed contract? 
A. I was under the assumption that that was my guaranteed contract, yes. 
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Q. Am I understanding you correctly that you agree there was not a contract and that 
the Rutter Group -- there was a situation where the Rutter Group had no reasonable 
alternative but to deal with your mother and therefore with you? 
MR. BRUNSON: I object to the form ofthe question. 
THE ·wiTNESS: We used, your verbiage, in the form of contract. What you just 
said we would say contract. 
Q. (BY MR. ALEXANDER) Okay. So is it fair to say, then, that you lmderstood that the 
Rutter Group could, if it wanted to, simply take this business in-house or take it to another 
vendor, but that it would be prohibitively expensive for them to do so? 
A. Yes. 
(ABI depo 80-81) 
April Beguesse also testified in an affidavit that she knew that the customer possessed a 
complete copy of those files, because CBI and later ABI always sent the customer a disc containing 
a complete copy of the PageMaker-format files with each update for use in preparing the CD-ROM 
version of the books. (April Beguesse Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment) 
As noted above, the Court granted summary judgment on this claim, finding it undisputed 
that Plaintiff knew there was no "guaranteed contract." However, at trial, the identical claim, 
couched in different words but based on the same evidence and the same legal theory, was permitted 
to go to the jury. 
The Plaintiff argues that she did not receive "ownership" of the library of files. Her testimony 
was that by "ownership," she meant the ability to control her customer's choice of who to use for 
typesetting. Because she could not control who the customer would use, she believed she was unable 
to sell the business, and therefore believed she was damaged. 
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This is the identical claim as that on which the Court previously granted summary judgment. 
Having heard the evidence, judgment for the Defendant is warranted on the law of this case, which 
is that Plaintiff was aware at the time she entered the contract that she would have no ability to 
control her customer's typesetting choices. Judgment n.o.v. on Plaintiffs claims of fraud and breach 
of contract/breach of warranty based on the "library of files" issue should be granted in favor of the 
Defendants. 
B. No Legal Basis for Claim of Fraud or Breach Regarding "Library of Files" 
Judgment n.o.v. is also warranted on the grounds that the fraud and breach claims based on 
"ownership" of the library of files is without a legal basis. The jury found a breach of contract and 
warranty and may have found fraud regarding the alleged library of files. There was no legal basis 
for either claim under the evidence presented at trial, and neither should have been sent to the jury. 
The Plaintiff claimed she believed she was buying a legal right incident to "ownership" of the files 
that does not and cannot exist. There is no way that a seller's representation of"ownership" can be 
construed to mean possession of rights that cannot legally exist. Thus, her fraud claim is premised 
on her misunderstanding of the law, or at best a layman's misrepresentation of the law. It is well 
settled that fraud cannot be predicated on misrepresentations of law or as to matters of law, Glass 
v. Southern Wrecker Sales, 990 F. Supp. 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1998), affd, 163 F.3d 1361 (lith Cir. 
1998) (applying Alabama law). 
Before a claim can be sent to the jury to determine the fact question whether fraud was 
committed, it is necessary to answer the precedent legal question whether the facts, if proven, even 
state a claim for fraud. In this case, it was necessary for the Court to determine the meaning of 
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"ownership" with respect to the files in question, to determine whether "ownership" of the property 
involved in the transaction includes the rights the Plaintiff claims she did not receive. 
The Plaintiffs claim was that she was promised "ownership" of the files, and that she could 
later sell them to a third party "like Christa sold them to me." She claims she did not receive 
"ownership" of the files because she could not sell them to a third party to do typesetting work for 
the Rutter Group without the Rutter Group's permission. She concluded from this that, because 
Plaintiff is unable to direct how the Rutter Group will use the files or who the Rutter Group may 
work with, she cannot sell her business. The damages she claims result exclusively from this 
supposed (and completely unproven) inability to sell the business. 
A relevant fact established by the evidence is that Plaintiff was aware at the time she agreed 
to purchase the business that CBI' s practice was to provide the Rutter Group with a complete copy 
of the files in question in PageMaker format. She was aware that CBI did not have exclusive 
possession of these files, as the customer had a copy. She was also aware that the files had no value 
except for purposes of doing typesetting work for the Rutter Group. 
Plaintiffs claim thus defines "ownership" of the files to include the right to sell the files to 
a third-party typesetter and require the Rutter Group to use that third party's services, or to require 
the Rutter Group to purchase the files from the Plaintiff even though Rutter already possesses the 
files. It is the Defendants' supposed failure to deliver these alleged incidents of ownership that 
constitutes the fraud claimed in this case. 
However, there is no legal basis for a claim of ownership that includes such rights. Those 
alleged rights are not and cannot be incidents of "ownership" of the files she purchased, for the 
following reasons, and Plaintiffs belief to the contrary was unreasonable under the circumstances. 
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As an analogy, if the Plaintiff claimed fraud because she expected "ownership" of the files 
to include the copyrights to the Rutter publications, the claim would never have reached the jury 
regardless of the facts shown, because ownership of a copy provides no legal basis for claiming 
ownership of the copyright: 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is 
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. 
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in 
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted 
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of 
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey 
property rights in any material object. 
17 U.S.C. § 202. Thus, as a matter oflaw, no person could reasonably expect to receive "ownership" 
ofthe copyrights in the Rutter Group publications under the circumstances present here. That belief 
would be unreasonable as a matter oflaw, and no fraud could be found. To find fraud under those 
circumstance would require evidence that the Defendants were knowledgeable of copyright law and 
schemed to take advantage of Plaintiff ignorance. 
Similarly, in the case as tried in this Court, the rights the Plaintiff expected to receive cannot 
legally exist. The fault for Plaintiffs disappointment lies in the Plaintiffs ignorance of the law, not 
fraud. Fraud under these circumstances can only be proven by evidence not presented here. 
The following paragraphs will demonstrate that the control of the customer that Plaintiff 
testified she expected to receive is not an incident of ownership of these files. 
The files in question are electronic copies in PageMaker format of the customer's 
publications. The customer, by assignment from the authors, owns the copyright. The files on 
Plaintiffs servers are legally created copies. They do not themselves infringe the copyright, per 
statute, because they are legally created. As such they may be lawfully owned, possessed and 
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transferred; but they may not be used to infringe the copyright, any more than one's ownership of 
a copy of the latest bestseller gives one the right to photocopy it for a friend. Since files in 
PageMaker format can only be used to prepare additional copies for publication, they have little 
value except for that purpose. Since they can only be used lawfully for that purpose with the 
permission of the copyright owner, the files have value only to a party with a business relationship 
with the customer. 
The Plaintiff asserts she believed she would receive "ownership" of the files. "Ownership" 
means the "collection of rights to use and enjoy property." Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. 
"Property" has often described as a "bundle of rights." Different kinds of property have different 
rights associated with them. Ownership of rural acreage carries different rights that ownership of a 
New York City condominium unit, ownership of an automobile, or ownership of a copy of a 
copyrighted work. In this case, to understand the Plaintiff's claims, it is necessary to identify which 
rights come along with "ownership" of the copies at issue. 
Ownership of a copy of a publication implies the right to read it, the right to pass possession 
of the copy to another (17 U.S.C. § 109(a)), but not the right to republish it, because that is an 
incident of ownership ofthe copyright (17 U.S.C. § 106), not of a copy. The particular copies at 
issue in this case are in a format usable only by typesetting software. They can only be used to make 
more copies, which, to be lawful, can only be done with the permission of the copyright owner. (17 
U.S.C. § 1 06) Therefore, the rights represented by "ownership" of these files only include the right 
to use them for typesetting purposes with the permission of the copyright owner. 
Since the Plaintiff does not own the copyright, the files naturally and obviously (and 
admittedly) have no significant value apart from the copyright owner's permission to use them to 
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typeset new editions. If the copyright owner withdraws its typesetting work from the Plain tiff- a risk 
of which the Plaintiff was aware when she entered the agreement, as this Court previously ruled 
it thereby also withdraws its permission to use the files for their intended purpose. The files would 
then have no significant value to the Plaintiff. (Thus, the hypothetical damage resulting to the 
Plaintiff in this case is in fact the result of a known business risk, not fraud.) 
The Plaintiff would normally still have the right, as an incident of ownership of a copy, to 
pass possession ofher copies to another, for whatever price she could obtain. This is the "first sale" 
doctrine in copyright law, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which holds that the owner of a lawful copy may 
transfer it to a third party. However, as noted, the files in this case would have no value without the 
copyright owner's permission to use them, except perhaps to a potential copyright infringer who 
intended to make unlawful copies. Thus, in this case there is no significant lawful value to the 
owner's right to pass the files to another. 
Furthermore, the copyright owner, to protect itself from this potential infringement, would 
naturally insist as a condition of business that the files be destroyed or turned over to the copyright 
owner when it withdraws its typesetting work from the Plaintiff. This is as testified to by Linda 
Diamond Raznick. Since the files have no value without the typesetting, this would not damage the 
Plaintiff. 
Given the Plaintiffs knowledge that she did not have exclusive possession of the PageMaker 
format files, and her knowledge that she had no agreement with the Rutter Group requiring it to use 
her services, is there any way the Plaintiff could reasonably conclude that her "ownership" of the 
files could give her the right to control Rutter's use of its copyright, or require Rutter to use her 
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services? If not, can Plaintiff's legal mistake support a fraud claim? Can the Plaintiffjustifiably rely 
on her own mistake of law? 
The answer is no. This Court would never permit a fraud claim to go forward if the Plaintiff 
claimed she thought "ownership" of the files gave her the copyrights. Yet in this case the Plaintiff 
is claiming essentially the same thing: that she thought "ownership" of the files gave her "control 
over who Rutter could do business with," to quote the Plaintiff's testimony from trial. There is no 
such right in the bundle of rights associated with ownership of a non-exclusive electronic copy in 
PageMaker format of the Rutter publications. Such a claimed right is inconsistent with the 
customer's ownership of the copyright, which grants the customer the sole right to make and sell 
copies of the work. (17 U.S.C. § 106) The right Plaintiff claimed she was to receive is thus contrary 
to law. Ownership of a copy implies or creates no rights to control the use of the copyright (17 
U.S.C. § 202). Since such a right could not exist under the law, Plaintiff's fraud claim must fail. 
VI. ABI'S BREACH CLAIMS AGAINST CBI MUST FAIL 
To establish a breach of contract claim a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a contract existed 
between plaintiff and defendant; (2) the defendant breached the contract; (3) the plaintiff has been 
damaged on account of the breach; and (4) the amount of the damages. IDJI 6.10.1. Further, the 
breach must be material. IDJI 6.11 defines a "material breach of contract," as that term is used in 
these instructions, means a breach that defeats a fundamental purpose of the contract. 
A. Plaintiff's Irrational Testimony Regarding the Terms of the Agreement 
Plaintiff's testimony regarding the terms ofthe contract were vague and irrational. Plaintiff's 
breach claims are inseparably connected and identical to its fraud claims. Thus, the same arguments 
raised above regarding ABI' s fraud claims apply in the context of its breach claims (and hereby 
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incorporated by reference as if set forth in full). In particular, even though Plaintiff has a lower 
burden of proof concerning the breach causes of action (preponderance verses clear and convincing), 
it is against the clear weight of evidence for the jury to have conclude that CBI owned a library of 
proprietary titles, that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software and/or that Christa has a will that 
allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon Christa's death. 
B. Recovery Under Both Fraud and Breach Claims is Precluded 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to recover under two separate legal theories. As the Court 
noted on page 21 of its Memorandum Decision, dated November 2, 2010, "IfPlaintiffis successful 
on the fraud claim, the contract may be considered void and there would be breach." The jury found 
all three Defendants liable for fraud, therefore, Plaintiff's breach claims should be rejected as there 
is deemed to have been no valid contract. 
C. Improper Verdict Form 
Question 8 of the Verdict Form fails to specifY whether the breach was related to the library 
of files or some other term of the agreement. Thus the jury could have awarded damages for CBI' s 
alleged breach based on a term previously rejected by the Court (guaranteed contract, Mr. Rammell 
was 50% owner of CBI, etc.) and which were not fundamental to the purpose of the contract. 
D. Damages Awarded by Jury For Breach Not Supported by Evidence 
The $190.013.00 awarded to ABI on Question 8 is no supported by any evidence presented 
to the jury. Nothing at trial supports that award, nothing. 
Overall, all of ABI' s breach of contract and warrant claims against all Defendants must fail 
for a lack of substantial and competent evidence. This Court should enter judgment n.o.v. against 
ABI on its breach claims pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b). In the alternative, this Court, when weighing 
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the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, must set aside the verdict based upon its independent 
evaluation and order a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59( a)( I), (5), (6) and (7). 
ORAL ARGUMENT is hereby requested, in which evidence and testimony may be 
presented. ;/ j 
Dated this~of April, 2012 
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.!N THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC. 1 an Idaho 
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605 N. Capital 
rdaho Fallsr Idaho 83402 
Phone: (20B} 529-.1350 Ext. 1138 
E-Mail: jfullAr@co~bonnerville .id, us 
CLOSING ARGUME.NX BY THE ?LAINTIFF 
APRIL 13 I 2012 
MR. BRUNSON~ May it plea.s e the CoGrt r 
opposing counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jux:y. We 
have very much appreciated your ti:ne this week as Ye've 
been able to present to you au:r case. Hard work pays 
oif, and I think the best analogy of hard work paying 
off is in the sports .realm. :t like sports ver.y much. 
In fact, I particulaxly like college football. And in 
the recent years, just this last year actually, there is 
an example in the sports realm that applies to .some of 
the issues we're talking about here. 
College football program, mid-sized college 
foot.ball progra:ro, b.r:ings in the top quarterback recruit 
.in the country~ He is number one. on all the recruiting 
boards. He is the man. In tact, when he comes to the 
school, he has a press conference and he has his 
publici.st there and he's going to be the quarterback to 
take over the future. No'H, there:'~:!' another quarterback 
involved. And he-'s a little older,. he'.s a little bit 
undersized, he's a little bit of .a scrapper, and he's 
there !irst. And this new quarterback comes in and is 
awarded the starting position because of who he is and 
because of his <;xeat accomplishment!! in high .school. 
And he plays a little bit, But ultimate).y thi.s other 
Al?I>&ARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAI~TIFE' ~ 
:SOR THE OE:E'E.NDANTS: David E. Esq. 
Attorney 
Racine~ Olson, Nye, Budge & 
Bailey~ Chartered 
P .0. Box 13.91 
Pocatello, !daho 83104-1391 
Phone: (208} 232-6101 
Facsimile: (208) 232-6109 
E-.Mail: dea@racine.law, net 
quarterback who's working hard, who's volunteering to be 
on .special teams 
Now, some of the guys on the jury, I'm sure, 
and a lot of the women as well, I don't I know 
there's a lot of football fans. But special teams, fo:t 
those who don• t watch football, is the part where they 
kick the ball off and the two teams run at each other: 
full speed and it's kicd o! kamikaze and they go at each 
other and there's a lot of injuries with people who play 
special teams and things like thAt. 
But this other quarterback, bee a use he 1 s a 
scrapper, he 1 s doing the work, he's wanting t.o get. 
involved, so he volunteers to be on special teams "'ven. 
And the.r:e a time to a point in the season where 
the unde:~si:ted 1 the scrapper, quartet"back takes over al,1d 
wins the tealtl,, He got. there. because- of the hard wo::-k. 
Now, the other quartel:back still has a sense of 
entitlement. He wants to play" But. because he got 
benched, instead of working hard and in:steaci of helping 
out, inst.ead of getting his teammates behind him, he 
transfers. 
April Begues.se works hard for her business. 
You heard her testimony about that. 'tou heard the 
amount of time and effort and energy Ahe puts in on a 
dai.ly basis. She knows everything about the business 
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It's with he-r when she wakes up in the morning and it's 
probably wi t.h her when she wakes up in the middle of the 
night. And wh~n she goes to bed at night 1 she has made 
her bUsinesS better. She'$ a SUCCe!ISfUl bQSinessper.soh. 
Any increa!les in her business ate dtle to her 
e;ffoxts~ Don't punish her for doing well in this 
Let.'~ talk a litt-le bit about :Mr. Ra.mmell; 
one of the Defendants in this case. 1\11 the t!';!totimolly 
that's come in is, is that Mr. Rammell had nc part at 
ell i.r. building the business we•.re t..811Xing about here. 
He didn • t contribute anything to the bus1 ness other than 
h!.:; testimony that he paid $500. If you remembe:::, when 
I asked himr it was just a que.s:.:ion I a.9ked~ ! didn 1 t 
know what he was going to say. But I asked him if he 
could even name one former client o:f CBl. He- couldn't 
do that. Ue 's expecting he has a sense of 
ent.itlelne!lt. He's expecting a handout in this 
One of my favorite recent movies is called 
The Socl«l Network. It's a Facebook movie. I'm sure a 
lot oi you have seen it. ln that novie there are 
several different parties and this is probably why I 
like it, becau::;e t'm a lawyer. But the.re are several 
different parties vying to clai:rn ownership and to claim 
money ac:ttJally from Mark Zuc:kerberg ~ the founde:::: of 
Facebocd: _ And one of these particular groups that is 
1.3 million dollars~ she said she was also promised 
proprietary software created by Christa 8egues.se 
Ramme11, and she was also told that the payments would 
~;ease upon death. Those were all representations made 
to her and they al.l pa::-t of the deal that was made 
between ABI and CBI. 
Uow, in this case the Defendants are trying 
to argue that possession is the ,sarr.e thing as owne;;-ship ~ 
And the easiest eKample I can use with this is a car 
lease. You can go down and lease a car and you g<!t to 
use the car, but you don • t own it. And at the end of 
the lease 1 guess Wh<.! t. 'fou have to give the car back. 
That's not the case here. Here it was represen'ted to 
April Seguesse tha:t she owned ce:rta1n files, and she 
doesnft own them. And all the. evidence that's coma in 
on that point has established that she does not own 
them~ Rutter Group, in t:his case Linda Diamond, has 
testified that they can demand for those files back at 
any time and April ~<ould get no compensation for them. 
N;:')W~ you just heard the .Jt:~dge go th:toogh 
some jury instructions and it is a mouthful of legal 
terms and it. is qui t.e confusing. Ahd bear with 
little bit here, but it is important to go tbxough 
th-:se with you. And 'll try to do so in 
that•s --one, doesntt in:gult you;r intelligehc:e and, 
trying to clai.t:t -- make clairos against f'acebook is these 
two ge.ntlemer. 11amed the Winklevoss twins. And any of 
you that have seen the ntovie are familiar with them. 
They're these big athletic rowers and -- actually 
Olympic row!!!.ts who went to Harva.rd. They're actually 
real people. The movie is t'iction, but it's based 
loosely on What actuallY happened. But anyway, these 
Winklevoss twins .make this claim t.o fame, Facebook~ Jl..~nd 
this i:s what Nar!..: zuckerberg says in the movie. This is 
a quote. He says, "You kno1,.1, you really dontt n.<i!e.d a 
forensic team to get to the bottom of this. If you guys 
were the inventors of racebook, you would have invented 
Fa:cebook." 
And again~ here, just comparing- it to the 
cast of characters we have here, April is the one 
working for the business. She's the one doing the work. 
She's the one growing the business. Mr. Rammell ha!! 
done nothing. He has contributed nothing to the 
hut~ ine.s.s 1 but yet. he wants to be paid hund;:;ed::t of 
thousands of' dollars. 
Now, in this ca.se what was promised and 
agreed to is in dispute. You've heard two different 
versions of the facts in this April's testimony 
wa:!!l clear this issue. She said she waes premised 
ownership of the lib,.a;ry of files valued between 1 and 
twa~ is helpful. And so I'm not gcing tc go through all 
because it's a pa:::ket and you can read them, but there • .s 
a :fe'# 1 do want to go th:::ough with you. And they relate 
to our claim.o in the case, the legal c1~itns that'll be 
brought to you. 
The first one is Jury Instruction: Number 21. 
The Judge issued instruction in this case that says, 
"Statements made: by Christa Begue:gse may not t:e 
conside:ted as evid~:;:nce supporting a claim against the 
estate of Christa Beguesse. Such evidence, however, may 
be u,sed for any other purpose~'' And what i.s meant by 
that is, April has testified Christa said tc her cer-t.!!in 
things~ And although those -- that testimony, based on 
this instruction, cani:t be used against ou2; claim 
against. the estate, because we have a claim against the 
estate of Christa Beguesse., it can be use-d aga.inst the 
corporAtion, CBI. And that's merely the point I wanted 
to make with that instxuction. 
Instruction -- you have sever.al instructions 
dealing wi tb ou~ fraud claim. Instructions 
Instroction !'lumber 29 is the :m.ain instruction dealing 
with the fraud claim. And it goes through 10 
requirements, and all the facts that support these 10 
requirements for fraud are present here. And I want to 
go through those with you just brief 1 y because I'm going 
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to talk tno:re in depth in a minute about each of these 
things, but. 1 just want to J<ind of lay the groundwork 
w:i.th you" So please bear with me, 
The f'irst requirement is that the Defendants 
stated a fact to the plaintiff. He.rer as I've just 
indicated, we've identified three critical fact.s that 
they stated -- one; that the ownership of the library of 
files was valt:ed at 1 to 1. 3 million dollars, that we 
wo;:~ld be getting ownership; two, proprieta:r-y .software 
created by Christa; and three, the payments would cease 
on death. 
1'he ::~econd :t:equi:r:ement of that is that those 
.statements be false. WelL in this case the testimony 
that '.s come in -- and it ts testimony th:tough the Rutter 
Group, who • s the customer -- that statement about 
ownership of files was false. The Rutter Group bas 
testified that they own all those files. :tmd not only 
that. Mr~ Rammell~ when he was askeq about this, if you 
recall and r eVeh brought out his deposition on this 
point -- he testified if the- Rutter Group claims 
ownership 1 he wouldn't di.spttte it or argue about it. So 
clearly in this case April doesn't own those files. 
There's been no evidence presented to suggest that she 
does. 
As to the proprietary softwarer you've beard 
11 
did that is be;;ause we didn •t teallY own anything other 
than some equipment valued at about $3500 and we: had 
about that much cash ill the bank." And that es ti~bl ishes 
that they knew at that t.i!Ile that they didn't own a 
library of files valued at betVJeen 1 and 1.3 million 
dollars. 
Now, the fifth requirement:, the Plaintiff 
did not know that the .statement was false. 1\p:r-il. 
testified that lll:he didn't know that. She also testified 
that she was relying on that, which is the :seventh 
requirement. I'iU gett.inq ahead o!; myself a little: bit. 
The sixth requirement ac·tually is that the 
Defendants intended the Plaintiffs to rely on it. Nell, 
they wanted her to come out and do this deal, 
l1.r _ Rammell testified at some length. This was tJart of 
their retirement. April acted :reasonabJ.y in this case. 
That's !or you to determine. B'..lt that's ,,..hat the 
evidence sho\>ts. 
And then we get into damages. And I '11 talk 
<>bout damages in a little bit. But that's fraud 
claim. And all those elements that I just went through 
have been established in this ca.se 1 and many of them are 
not even in dispute, 
There •s another instruction related to fraud 
and that is 34.1 and it's dealing with a topic called 
testimony from April that it was just a program that. 
could be purchased off the shelt, Page-Maker. So the 
statement regarding proprietary software, that she had 
come up wt th thia thing on her own, was false. 
As to the payments ceasir:::g: on death, we • re 
being sued by them to :pay them for those payments. 
10 
The third .requirement is_,. the statement 
l'tl.aterial so it vas import.ant. the statements were 
important. The statement regarding -- .all those 
stat.eme-nt.'l are what brought April out to Idaho to do the 
deal. Yo:.J heard that testimony. 
The fou..rth requirement is, the Defendants 
either k;nl!t\4 the st.at.ement \ll<'lS false or wez:-e unaware 
whether the statement was true at the time the statement 
wa:s made. Now- 1 this was est;;~blished also at trial. And 
there lots of different pieces of evidence tha~ 
could apply to this particular requirement. But one 
critical one was the testimony we heard f:rotn Steve 
Martin, the Idaho Falls attorney who actually 
represented Hr. Rammel! and Christa Beguesse. And he 
testified that they placed a $40,000 value on their 
business in 1.999. Now, that was shortly before this 
deal was done. 
And then you heard additional testimony from 
Mr. Hammell clarifying that. He said, "The reason we 
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the statut::e of limitations. Some of you may have heard 
ot th.at before. And o,ohat t-he statute of lintitation:s is, 
is it says ir: the legal world you hav~ to bring your 
claims within a reasonablt1 ti:me essentially. And wi.th a 
fraud claim, a.s 34.1 goes thrcu~h, the time to bring 
your claim is within three years ·from. the time you 
discove.t the ft""aud. 
And you heard testimony ;i.n this c.ase from 
Ap.ril Beguesse; and she said, "Itve worked-- the 
transition occurred in 2004, and l continued to work 
with my mother and Linda.'' And she testi.fied she had no 
idea that she didn t t own those files until she had --
after she had a conver3ation with l':lr. Rammell shortly 
after he.r had passed~ and that conversation prompted 
her to call Linda Pi.atnand. And you'll r:ecall the 
testimony that April gave about her conversation with 
Lind .a Diamond where she testified that • s the first she 
ever learned that the Rutte.r Group owned those files, 
And that happened in late 200£!, ea.rly 2009. Well, we 
filed the lawsuit in this matter in 2009., :so clearly 
we're within the three years. 
She acted reasonably. There was no reason 
for her to be inquiring as to that ownership issue 
because she was building he.::: business.v She wasn't 
seeking to sell it. There was no reason for her to have 
454 
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that conversation with Linda at any time ot.her until 
she became aware after her conversation with Mr. Rammall 
that something '-'as:n't right, and she acted promptly when 
she ~- after she found that out. Now, tha!::. r s the fr<~ud 
clain ~ 
We also have what's called a breach of 
contract claim 1 and itt:~ ve;r;y l'dmilar to our fraud claim 
insofar as the facts that apply. It's the same three 
things. And I'm not going to go back through thos~ 
because I've already said it twice. But lt's those 
things three elements that exist in our :fraud clairn. 
And the -- but. the statute of limitations issues -- and 
the requirements for breach of contract are a little hit 
dif!erent. Let ttle touch on that just really briefly~ 
If you look at you:r I:1struction Number --
bear with me -- 24 and 25, those are the two pri.marily 
dealing with the contract . .At1d on Number 24 it just 
deals 
the 
just. describes what a contract is-. No one in 
i$ disputing that t.he.re 'Was a contract between 
ABI and CBI. That's not in dispute. Sa really 24 is 
helpful, but there's really no dispute that there is a 
contract. 
N"umber 25 gives you a little bit more 
instruction bec~use it talks about Hbat the Cou:tt has 
done alxeady in this case. And i! you .read just the 
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carefully look at these instructions. The one that 
applies to our bx:each of contract claim and actually ou:r 
breach of \-la:n:anty claim regarding the library of files 1 
regarding the p:t:orni.s:e to sell t'l& a library of files 
valued at 1 million to 1.3 million, as .to that specific 
claim, 34.2: is the one that applies. And what you'll 
see as you read that, it says# "The statute of 
limitations fo.r Pl.aintiff 's alleged breach. of contract 
regarding a library o! .files is taut y~ars .;~nd begins to 
.run from the time ABI knew of the Rutter Gr:oup 's claim 
of ownership inte:cest in the libT.ary of files." And 
here the only testimony you heard about when ABI knew 
the ownership ihtere.st was, agalnl that 
conversation I just talked to you about a min\.\te ago 
bet-ween April Beguesse and Linda Diamond; and the 
lawsuit was filed within that fou.r- yea.r:s, 
Now, as to our claim regarding pl:'op:rietary 
software, there~s actually a separate statute of 
limitations on that one. 'l'hat one is Number 35 1 and it 
goes through some detailed requireJllents. I '11 just d:.aw 
your attention to it now. I doh't waht to go thr:ough 
all of that with you~ 
Okay. We a.lso have a breach of warranty 
claim" And breach of warranty is very similar to breach 
of co!ltract. .And the instruction that applies to-
14 
first line of Instruction Numb~r 25, it. says, "The terms 
of the oral agreem~n.t bet\>"een Christa Beguesse, !nc., 
anci April Be9ue.sser Inc., in dispute." And so what 
was actually agreed is in dispute. But al:Jo what. was 
act.uall':{ agreed was cral. And that's why we had to 
listen to everyone's testimony. That 1 s why we couldn't 
just look at the writ.ten document and say, "Wellf that's 
the deal ..... The Court has determined -- and it's not 
disputed in this case -- that the.re 'Was an oral 
agreement. And so we have to \lie' ;;e going to have to 
weigh everybody 'a. te.:l timony here and figure out who you 
think telling the truth a.bout the deal. 
And, in fact 1 if you go further down in 
Instruction Number 25! the last line, it says, ''The 
Court prav;loU$ly ruled that E.:r::hibit 2 in this vase, u 
which vas the lease agreement that had the blank 
attachments and nothing in there, "is not an enforceable 
contract.... So those are the br:each of contract 
instructions. 
NoW 1 to the stututc of limitations issue 
I was talking abont with fraud, well, in a breach of 
contract guess what. The rules are a little bit 
different than they are in .fraud. In .tact, !or each of 
our claims the statute of limit~tions requirements are a 
little bit. different. And so you're going to have to 
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breach of warranty claim. is Ihstruction Number 28. And 
I,ll just re.t'er you to that. But it state!:!, "A warranty 
is a -- an express waJ:":ranty is a warranty created by 
wards or actions of the selle;r;.'1 And so the same three 
representations we're dealing with here tie' re dealing 
with under: our breach of warranty. Let me rephrase 
that. Actually, the payments ceasing on death, that's 
not part of our breach of warranty claim. It 1 s just the 
lib:r:a.ry of files a~d it•s ju.5t the software on that one. 
That's Instruction r.h:nnber 2 B. 
Okay. I think l •ve bored everyone with my 
discussion on the law. And so think what ~- as I 
stated~ what the parties have agreed to is in dispute.. 
l'1hat happened here is in dispute. And it's up to you, 
the jury I don't get. to do it. Opposing coun!'!el 
does-n't get to do it. It's up to you, the jury, to 
decide t.he credibility of wi tnesse.s. 
And one thing X $tr-uggle with in this case 
is, no one wants to disrespect their elder:s; and I 
certainly did!1' t want to do \:hat through the of 
the trial. And then in add.itian to Hr. Rammellts kind 
of overt attempts, r thought, in this ca.se to kind of 
make you feel sorry .for him, that. also e li tt1e 
thot.:lght, because he brot.~ght up his poor 
health and he broug'ht up his supposed povet:ty. Don't 
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let that testimony sway your deliberations. And 1 1 m not 
aware of any adage or: p:roverb that suggests that being 
oldar makes you somehow mor:e honest. Becaq~e it is up 
to yot.J. to we.igh the credibility of the witne.sses. 
So let~ s talk about that. .Let • s talk about 
the credibility of the witnesses in this case. 
Specifically let' .:s talk about Mr. Ramme:l a nO what 
did -- what we heard from him at the trial of this 
:matter. Mr. Rammell testified that he a 50 percent 
owner in the business of CBI, and then he also went 
to testify that he had provided tax information !'or the 
tax retu:rns lind that he was the one that had generated 
tha"t. information. H~ also testified that he had even 
signE'ld some of tht:l tax returns. 
And then we actually looked at the doct.nue.ntr 
which is Exhibit 27a, which you'll have. So this i.s 
Exhibit 27a. And you saw this at the trial. And if you 
look on here, yot.;.'lJ. see that shareholder percentage of 
stock ownership is a hundred pe.rcent1 ~nd the only 
shar~holder listed is Christa Beguesse. And .!.JO clearly 
that was not consistent with his previous testimony. 
We al.so heard Mr. RamrneU. -- Hr. Rammell 
admitted t.o telling Aprii that after there. was a -- they 
ha.d a conve.rs~tion that -- and yott remember hearing the 
testimony about this -- that Mr. Rammell told April that 
they testified. And perhaps the biggest contradiction 
come:s from. his -- the deposition itself, And I took 
som.e time in the trial to point out that we started his 
deposition in the afternoon of one day and then 
continued it the second day. 
And on the. first day Mr. Ratnmell 
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testified -- and you heard this r and I .read it into the 
reco.rd -- t·fr. R~mro.ell testified he didn"t know who owf\ed 
the files. That was his testimony. And then he said he 
would not argue with the Rutter Grot..<p or Linda Diamond 
as to who owned them. And he said r "! have no way to 
valuate -- evaluate. the value of those files." So he 
could not have told April what the value was. That was 
his testimony the !i.rs t. day. 
On the second day and, as I pointed out, ! 
thinkr when I w.!l.s even asking him the questions, after 
he had a chance to talk to his a<:torney, he said he 
said -- he then took the positionr "Well, wait. CBI 
the files,'' and that they weref in fact, part of 
the Va.!Ue of the company 1 ~nd then he a.dmi tted to 
telling that to Ap::il Beguesse. That's a big diffe-rence 
from just. one day to the next. 
Nmt, you heard other testimony from 
Mr, Ramrnell in this trial. You heard his test.imony that 
he was running out of money. And that kind of pet;plexed 
the only will that e;;:;isted wa.s a 2007 holographic will. 
And didn't talk abot.<+~ holographic lff"i1ls; but 
what a holographic will is, it'!J. a will don-e in your own 
handwriting. And Mr, Ramrnell told -- and you hea:rd him 
testify to this_, that he told April that that w~s the 
only will that exist.ed. 
Wellf as Mr. Martin late.r testified in the 
trial, there actually was a 19:9.9 will; and Mr. Rammell 
admitted that there wa.s a 19:99 will. Again, another 
instance of a contradiction by Hr. Rammell. 
When I asked Hr. Ra:n.:nell -- I had him up 
the stand. He wasn't up there very lo::1.g~ :I: didn't 
think. But >rhen I asl-:ed him if he•d performed a. 
valuation of the business before selling it to ABir he 
at !ir~t. tried to claim he did. A.nd then had to 
I -- remember# I published the deposition and then I 
read it to him; and his deposition testimony 
contradicted his te.stitnohy at trlal. 
asked Hr. Rananell about docuruents 
de.rnonstrating car' :s intellectual property. He started 
to claim that there was such documents. Again I pulled 
au.t his deposition testimony, I read it to him, and 
again his testimony contradicted. 
Now, these deposit1ons are done Uhder oath, 
j u:~-t like they were sworn in here when they -- before 
me a little bit, And in this trial the -- another 
exhibit that was admit ted was E.xhihi t 45. Now, you 
won't have t..his big huge blow-up with you But, if you 
J:·ecall 1 this is fron Steve Martin .and this i$ the 
exhibit that cam..e into evidence -chat establishes the 
different values they gave on things. .And I h<'ld Steve 
Martin go through these, And you can the busine$!1 
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there for 40r000. But the total value of the estate wa.s 
900,000. And that was neve::: really put into dispqter 
and that w~s in 1999. So the total value of the estate 
in 1999 was $900r000. 
And then at some l~ngth went through the 
car t:ax :return-s: with Mr . .Rammell. I think: you'd recall 
me doing that. And as we did "that, he testified to the 
o.t CBI; and he testified that he l;"eceived 
between two hundred CBI received between 240~ 000 -co 
224 1 000 dollars a year of revenue .from 2000 to 2003. 
And then he al.so testified about the business income; 
Ahd that business income from 2000 to 2003 was $461 1 000. 
And then it's undisputed in this 
200B ABI paid $750 fOOO to CBI. 
that £rom 2004 to 
Now 1 l added that up. I added up the 
cla:tm~ad business income, which was 4€1~000; l added up 
the -$900 1 000 in the estate; and thert l adde.d that to the 
.$/50,000; and that comes to a total of $2.1 :million. 
456 
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And here he wa.s testifying that he was out of money He 
didn tt offer any exp1.5natioh as to where the money went. 
Ke just expects evel:"yone to believe him that he's out of 
money. 
:blo\.1, consider r.he testi1:1ony of Renee Heller. 
Renee Heller was just a nousekeepe.r. Renee Heller: 
worked for. M:r. Rarnmell and Christa Beguesse Rammell for 
12 years. That's what she testified to. :Now, this 
one of the times in trial, if you'll recall, that 1 had 
another attorney in our office, Lindsay Lofgran~ come up 
to the stand; and she read Ms. Heller~ a portion of her 
testimor:y from a different. hearing. And at that time 
M.s. Heller offered tha;; testimony 1 she was under oath, 
sworn under oath to tell the truth. 
And this is what she testified. And this is 
a quote. She said -- she was referring that Mr. Rammell 
was referring to April Oegues.se, and thi.s is what he 
said. He said -- she said, "He told me that he '<ta.s 
goi:1g to get that bit.ch~ He was going to destroy her." 
Then we heard testimony :from Rick 'I'rulson. 
That was yesterday morning, and that didn't last very 
long. I thir.Y. everyone was a little .surprised. wow,. he 
and off quick. I think he might have been here a 
minute or 90 .seconds. It may have been the shortest, 
but it ndght be the l'!lost compelling testimony we heard 
jurors that can be hard to follow because we're just 
reading along and it's sometimes ha:rd t.o catch 
everything. But she said a lot of i:t:tportant: thing!! in 
her testimony, a lot of things that p.rove 
She said Th':}mson Re•.1ters owns the files 
ABI • s computers. Now, ho one • s disputing who o•,.;ns the 
books in this case. No one's disputing who owns the 
books. What we're talking about is the lib,rary of 
electronic .t:i:!.es.. /l.nd she also testified c~early that 
ABI cannot sell those files to a third party. She 
testified that Mr. Ra.mmell had no involvement with CBI. 
She te.sti.ried that significantly she testified this, 
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that ABI what she termed a vendor at will, And what 
::Jhe said she met~.nt by that is that theo Rutter Group 
could go whereve-r: they want for typesetting services: 
and that~ again, is because th~ Rutter Group awns those 
tile:<:~ She stated that the Rutter Group could le.ave at 
any time for any purpose. 
Now, they're going to a.rgae and suggest, 
well, there's a great .relationship there and Linda's not 
going to want to go anywhere. Well, Linda dt:~esn't have 
final say. The Rutter Group is owned by Thomson 
Reuters 1 which is one o! the largest publish corn.panies 
in the- world. She's got basses she has to ans'<Jer to. 
She doesntt have final say. And the fact that Linda's 
all trial, And he came into coul:'"t and he also swore 
oath. He swore oath to tell the t.ruth. An.d he 
testified he knew Mt-. Rammell, he test-ified he had 
pex:sonal interactions with Mr~ Ratnmell, and he te.!l't.i!ied 
he tsd business dealings with Nr. Ra;nmellr and then h!'! 
offered this opinion. H~ said, "Mr. Ranuuell is a 
pathological liar." 
You, the ju.:cy, g~t determine the 
credibility of witnesses. But. in this case WB- didn't 
hear from any other witnesses to come in and say, "Well, 
Hr. Rammell has a tendency to tell the truth." 01:' we 
didn 1 t hear that from N.r. Rammell himself. He didn't 
try to .say, "Well, Trulson has it wrong. I teLl. the 
truth." We clidn 1 t hear any evidence to dispute that. 
Alls heard from someone who's under oath was t.hat he 
is a pathological liar~ That's not my words. 'I'hat•s 
someone who came here unde:r oath~ who's had business 
dealings with him. 
Now, th:roughout the trial heard di.fferent 
testimony from diffexent people. One of the key 
witnesses in this case -- and it was unfortunate she 
couldn • t be here -- wa.s Linda Diamond. And again~ 
did the same thing vhe.re we put Us. Lofgran on the stand 
and had her :read parts of hex deposition 1 and we did the 
question and answer thing. And I know that sometimes as 
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pleased with April, again, that's April's work. That 1 s 
April's hard 1</ork. She•s the that • s been working to 
establish that relationship. We even heard from 
Mr. R,ammell. He didn't dispute that Thomson Reuters 
the one who really dictated their .relationship 
She also tes-tified about a conversation she 
had with Mr. Rammell in December of 2008 ~ and that 
testimony, a~ain, is .siqnificant. She testified tha:::: 
Hr. Rammell carne out. l'his was a<;~ain Christa 
Beguesse had pas-sed in November of 2009. M:r:. Rammel1 
went out to Linda -- to speak with Linda Diaro.or.d in 
California. 
And thls i.'! 'What Linda said of the 
conversation. Quote, she said that there was :5ome 
agreement between April and Chxista and that April owed 
him money and was not paying hila the mone-y -- owe-d 
Christa the money and had stopped paying the money when 
she died. Given your close rel.ationship with Christa, 
maybe you could call April and tell he.r:- 1 quote, out of 
the goodness of her heart she should continue roaking 
those payments to him. 
She. then testifiedt "And I said I Gan,t do 
that and Christa would not want me to do that and she 
would probably be rolling ove:t in he:t gnwe right 




Now1 Linda Diamond was under oath when she 
said that. And this testimony is sign.i ficanl;. fot 
several reasons. B:en told her the money W"a.9 owed to 
Christa. Ken knows he's not owed the money. Ken told 
~er to ha.ve April pay out of the goodness of her heart. 
Ken knolrts he's not owed any money. 
Linda says~ "Christa would not have wanted 
me to do that. Christa would not have wanted the 
paynents to contint:e- because payments were supposed to 
cease death. Christa would be rolling ever in her 
gtave :right now if she knew what Ken was up to." That 
was the testimony. 
Now, Ken Rarnmell, he off~.red some additional 
testimony in this He admitted he wasn't involved 
in the bttsiness. He testified that he could have --
there could have been a separate oral agreem€!nt between 
Christa and April that he did not know about. He 
testified that. CBI \-las ttlak.ittg .revetlue.s in the $250, ooo 
range in 1999 and had been for quite some time; but he 
sti 11 only valued that company at .$ 40,000. 
Now, Mr. R;nnrnel.I t:ded to distance himself a 
little bit from that $qo,Ooo value he and Christa 
Begue sse Rammell gave to Steve Martin. And, as be 
testi.fied, he didn't just testify that he gave that 
value to Steve Ha.rt.tn; he testified that he and Christa 
would need to be paid, and so that :really it would be 
okay to give book value in that type o.f situation 
becau!'.'.e that• s What the IRS looks at, And then Steve 
Martin actually got a little animated; and be was like, 
"Oh, no, r.o, na, 'l'hey look up fair market value and 
what the business is actually w-orth ... 
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Now, let • s take Mr Rammell 's background for 
a second. Mr. Rammell is an accountant. Mr~ Rarmnell 
testified he was an accountant .from the 1950 •.s until he 
.:t;etired in the mid 90's. 40 years as an accountant. He 
knew what value he was giving at that time. 
Mr. Rammell went on to say that they had no 
one to give the business to at that time. 7hatts why ~­
that's the way he tried to explain it. He said they had 
no on~ to give the busihes.'3 to at that time, :::o it 
wasn't worth anything at all. 
He said if Christa died~ then there would be 
no value. Now~ let•s take a step back here and think 
about the situation ABI,. April, has testified she's in 
She has testified that her customer has told het: 
that she can't sell those li.brary file~; and you heard 
the customer say no~ she can't do that. She¥!1 testified 
that she doesn't own anyLhing because of the claim her 
customers made to ownership of those .files and, a~ a 
result, it'.s not worth anything .becau.se she can•t sell 
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Beguesse Ral'lllt.ell gave that value to Steve Martin in 
September of 1999. 
Now, let.'s think about the circumstances of 
this meeting with Steve Martin. April Beguesse wasn't 
in Idaho pal.ls. 'I' here wasn't litigation pending. Sides 
weren't posturing to arguer well, itfs really wo:rth this 
or it's really not worth this 
what that business was worth s t:raight up from thei:r 
attorney. And that was a confidentl~l communication. 
That was bet'W'een the:m and their attorney. Now, they 
otaived that contidential communication in this case; but 
at the time it was confidential. And that wa:s their 
true assessment of the value of the company ir,. 1999, 
$40,000 1 the same company they turned arot.:.nd and sold to 
April; and it 1 s not disputed that this was a purchase 
price for $1,152~000. 
Now, Mr. they tried to explain their way 
out of this. Mr. Rammell tr~ed to say, "Well, that was 
actt.~ally just the book value." .And then, if you 
re:nember, Mr. Alexander asked Steve Martin 
questions on cross; and I think they cried to explain 
what bock value was. By nbook value" they ;neant: the 
cash that was in the bank account. And Mr. Alex:ande.r 
tried to get steve Martin to admit that the rRs only 
considers book v~lUe in determining what estate tax 
it_ That 1 s April's testimony. Well, that's consistent 
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with the explanation Nr. Rammell'.s trying to giv':! When 
Mr. !'l.atnmell and Christa gave that Vt~lue o! $ 4C, 000 # 
their .business was generating big money.,. $250,000 a 
year. 
This case, what the business ea:rn.s in this 
case is not the true medsure of value. What the tru6 
measul·e of value is is the assets the busi::ess has. 
That's how they-- Mr. Rammell hin:self valued it. qnd 
that 1 s how ABI has valued it and that • .5 JHhat the 
business i.'.> worth because we ~ve heard tl!'stiThony in this 
case that the customer 1 the Rutter Group, could go 
anywhet:e at any ti:me for any purpose. TheY could just 
leave. That's the only custome:.r of this hu.sine.!ls. 
There i.s a huge risk there of th.qt happening. 
Now, Mr. Rallllllell a.lso testifiet:! t.hat he oaly 
consid<?.red two .tac:t.o.rs in considering the price to 
charge ABI, what they wanted to get out of the business 
and what .April could afford to pay. He said, "That's 
the only two factors ! considered." 
He also testified if the Rutter Group 
chooses to go elsewhere, the business wouldn 1 t be worth 
anything. He testified that the Rutter Group could 
choose to go elsewhere at any time 
He testified that and this was 
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significant too. HB testified .ABI was still required to 
pay even if they lost the customer. He wants to be paid 
no matter what. 
A value is 'What you can sell so1nething for" 
:r-rr. Rarrunell and Christa under-stood this; and that is why 
they or:.ly gave a $40,000 value when the business was 
making so much money. 
April ha::.: a job, but she doestJ. 1 t have 
ownership of anythir:.g other than the $.3500 in equipment 
that no one disputes .is the value. We'!:e talkiny abot<"t 
some old copiers and compute:t:s and things like that. 
But April washYt buying a job. She: had a job. She's 
taking on all the risk of the customer leaving. And l 
think a way t.o think about this is, what would ABI have 
if April dies tomorrow? Think about that fc"t a second w 
What would ABI have if Apr.!..l dies'.: Based on the 
evidence in this case, 11.8! would have ;some old copiers, 
an old copier and some old computers. It•s not worth 
anything, just like it. '<U!,sn't worth anything for CBI 
back in l999. 
April has built a business. she :manages t:he 
customer. She makes the improvements. She does the 
work. She is operating under risk of losing her only 
customer. Don~t puhish her for being .successful. 
Now, as a Plaintiff we get to ask for 
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training and customer relationship management. And she 
placed a value, I think a significant value, of $250,000 
on that. Shers not trying to shortchange this. She's 
net trying to nickel and dime this. She said, "Yes, my 
mother trained me up and she helpe-d me." Even though 
she had spent. Q lifetime working in this industry, even 
though she had worked in the business since she was a 
teenager, :she: still placed a value of 2.50, 000 on what 
she got f:roru he-r mom. She's not -- we're not disputing 
that. 
And you heard no other expert or no other 
witness come into this courtroont al)d say that that's not 
a rea:soneble number for what she got as far as the 
training, the mentoring, What she actually -- the stuff 
that was in h'er mom's head. You heard no other 
testimony about that, She was never challenged on that. 
Who -- she's the best person to o!fer that testimony 
because she know.s the business. She's the one doing the 
work* 
Now, so you add all that up ~nd you get 
you add up the Pagel1:aker, you add up the equipment, you 
add up the 250, 000~ and you get 254,100. And you take 
the payments. 
So our claims for !t'a!ld and breach of 
contract and breach of warranty, our position is this: 
damages .in this case. And it's al14ays an awkward thing 
dealing' with this subject, BUt I think based on the 
evidence in this cas<:!, there • .s been a few scenarios 
Can you o:;uys see. that okay'? 
UHIDEN'I'IE'lED JUROR: No, 
HR. BRUNSON: Yeah, that's what 1 was trying 
to mess around with. :t'w. not a cornpu.:.er expert. Let me 
see if I can get it a little bic blown up here. Let's 
t.ty this fi.rs t. Tell me if this helps. Does that help 
at all? No? i'hat probably didn't. Hang on There " 
I'll do it really big .. and we'll just go OM! scenario at 
a time. How is that? Is that better? Yeah? You guys 
in the back, in the corner? All right. 
All right. The .first scenario of damages in 
this case is based on April's testimony about value. No 
one disputed in this that she paid .$108,000. Now, 
there • s an Exhibit 1 that was admitted; and you can see 
the history of payments if you look at Exhibit L It's 
some QuickBook entrie:;; and it total:; up the pay;nents, 
it totals up the checks. There are several pages of 
that document. But Mr. Rammell doesn't dispute that. 
lf you look:, she also testified what she 
actually received from CBI, which was some off).ce 
equipmen.t of $3500; the P<'l.geMaker prog:r:alll, which was 
$500; and what I have tel;'meci -- and this i.s my term. --
That the valUe should be determined as of the date the 
asset or the lack of assets 'Jere transferred. The date 
of the tr&n.sition was January 1st¥ 2004. That's when 
the purchase was completed because that • s when Ani --
tthd it 1 s undisputed in this case -- took over fo:r CB!. 
So that's the date you look at. You don't look at 
things that happened a.tter the .fact. 1. mean~ it's like 
buying a stock. You buy stock and it tanks the next 
dayT well, that•:!'! too bed. l3Ut YOU look at the date 
that you pu:rchased it. The da:te the purchase was 
completed was January 1st, 2004. Now, she was .:requi:t"ed 
to make some payments just to finance it, but the 
purcha:'le was done on January 1st, 2004,. and so that's 
32 
the date value. things. And on that date the value of 
What we got was $254 1 100. That 1 s the value of \-!he.t we 
received~ 
Now, you '11 see anothe.r j ory instruction. 
And maybe just rnake a note of this. It • s' Ins"..:..ruction 
Number 39 that deals with ou.t b:reach of warranty claim 
and value and when you should value it. And t.ha t • s 
consistent with what. I've ju.st set forth. 
Okay. So if you take what was -- what we 
got and what we t:taid, $70 8, 0 00, there was some other 
payments that were made for o;:ont.r.a.ct labor to Christa 
Beguesse We're not including those.. 'there was another 
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40 or SO thousand dollars, but we're not. including thosE~ 
for: purposes of our calculation. And you subtract out 
what we got; and you end up with $453,900. Now, 
that 1 s one scenario that you 1 based on the evidence 
you've heard in this case, could determine ABI'.s 
damages. 
Another scenario you've beard in this case 
that W-'c::!'Ve talked about is Mr. Rammel! and Christa's 
value of the bUsiness before they sold it to April, 
befoxe there was any litigation, before there- WQ.s any 
really dispute; and they valued tha.t at $40,000. That 
was the value the-y gave the business. And so you can 
take what we paid for: it and what they sqid to their 
attorney in confide-nce, that it was actually worth 
$668,000. 
NoW, the thi.td scer-.~.do -- and April talked 
a lot abot<t this when she was being cross-examined by 
Mr. Alexander -- that she doesn't have these .files. She 
doesn't have these library of files that she was 
promised. She doesn't have ownership of them. she just 
does11't own them. And that was the primary reason she 
came out. to do this deal. Because she doesnrt own them 1 
she can't turn around and sell them to anybody. And she 
testified about that. 
Now, that -- there's evidence that suppo::t;t.s 
35 
based on their o~n conduct. So any defenses we have in 
this case, any claims we have in t.hi,s c11se are atso 
de.fe.nses. 
Now, April testified quite clearly in this 
case on mor:e than one occasion that both Christa and :Ken 
Rammell told her- that: payment!! were to cease upon her 
mother •.s death. That \Vas her t.est:.imony and I think it 
was clear and I think it in :tno:r e than one~ and you 
heard it mol:"e than on.ce. Now~ that is a complete 
de£ense to their clairas in this matter because i! that 
was part of the agreement 1 then those payments were not 
to continue. So the only way you can award them 
anything is if you determine that April under oath, 
sit.t..ing here, was lying to you. That's the only ~ay you 
award them a dtme in this case. You have to make 
the determination .she was lying to you. It's np to you 
to weigh the credibility of the witnesses here. 
Hr. Rammell testified that the:re's 
separate have been separate deals between .April and 
Christa. He testif"ied that he wasn't privy to all their 
conversations. So because he testified that he didn't 
talk about it, April disagrees with that. She testified 
that Mr. Raro.mell, in fact, did say those things to her 
as v1ell bl:lt thel':e' s other agreements that could have 
oc:cur.ted between Chrl.sta and her mother. 
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that theory. And that va.lue is what We paid; and that•~ 
$?08, 000. Now~ there • s evidence to .support all those 
theories; and itt s up to you to de~ide What to do. 
Now, I want to touch on anothe.r Jury 
instruction. This is 40.2. And 40.2, this talk:; about 
claims anti defenses and. things like that bec:austt in this 
case, yeah,.. we have claims but we're a:.:so being 
sued, as you know, !or the remaining _payments because 
those payments ceased wnen Christa passed pursuant to 
understanding of the agte!!'ltlent. 
An.d, now, in t.his case t:hey said we waited 
too long to file our lawsuit. W~ll, our position is, 
you know, that tts soon as we found out that we didn't 
own the files, within months we literally filed a 
lznv:suit. Ilut if you di.~agree, then the:ce c:ould 
potentially be a problem with the statute of 
limitations. And we went into the statute of 
limitations. aut what I'm getting at here is that we 
still have these :traud claims and this breach of 
cont:ract claim and the breach of warranty claim. lf we 
don't have a claim that He can. recover on he-cause 
waited too longr w-e do have a claim in respo:>se to what 
they're suing us for. There still ar~ good defenses, 
and that 1 s wha. t 40.2 talks about. It talks about we. can 
offset any damages that they• re trying to get from us; 
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.As I stated at the start o£ my closing 
argume-nt, hard work p.<.~ys off. Don't punish April for 
wori<ing hard. 
I appreciate you:.r time; I appreciate your 
attention; and on behalf of rn.y client~ we appreciate 
your .service Thank you. 
RI:BU':t!'AL ARGU.M&N't BY TBZ PLAINTIFF 
MR. BRUNSON~ I want to just touch briefly 
on th.:!' verdict form that Mr. Alexander .referred to. And 
I :meant to do thi.'l as pa;rt of my opening presentation, 
' 
and then 1 got some momem:u.m_ and I forgot. So as part 
of yo1.1r jury instructions you get a verdict form1 and 
th..at's what you fill. out at the end. And Mr. Alexao.de:r 
just referred to it. And the first question you 1 re 
asked a seri~s of questions regarding the parties' 
claims and how you're going to determine the issues in 
the case. 
And the first question is, 'TAre the 
Plaintiff 1 s claims of fraud bar:red by the statute of 
limitations?'' Now, wr.at that is asking is, is did 
wait too long to .file the lawsuit. If your to 
that is "yes 1 •• that means we can 1 t recover for fraud. 
So if you think we 1 re entitled to recover for Iraud, 
then you would need to answer ''no>t because it's saying 
our claim -- are the Plaintiff 1 s claims barred. And so 
460 
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if yDu say "yes," that means we have no claims. 
So that with thatt I think it•s just-~ 
there~ s same legalese in the:ce, so I thought that was a 
little confusing ll'IZ~Ybe. And that's true with the 
othe.r- -- they go through the other claims and ask the 
sane question. ':that's the first question it asks on all 
o! them. So that 1 s the only comment I have as to the 
verdict form. 
There a. couple o! stateme!'its in the --
Waul d you mind thank you. 
THE BAl.LIFE': {Turning on overhead TV). 
MR. BRUNSON: There was a couple of 
statements rna de about the lease agreerr.ent, E::<hibi t 2. 
And I will be brie£. Oh. Thie. itt Exhibit 2, 1:\:"ld yot~'ll 
have this w.t th you.. But CoUnsel :made this statement: 
''All the important provisions are in this agreement.'' 
You heard the testimony. You've heard the Judge's 
i.nstructions as to thi.9 agreemeht. But I'd point out, 
the very first word in the document i.s "'lease ... And 
that i~ actually not correct. The Court has determine-d 
that this was a purchase, so --
And then if you turn to the end -- and we 
did this .before the evidence came in -- if you see 
here Sxhibi t A, it says nbusiness. 11 So this was 
suppo3ed to be the business that's bein9 trans.ferred. 
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this Bxhibit .B, which youtll also have. 
Your Hoho:r-, may I approa.ch? 
THE COGRT: Sure-
MR. BRITHSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
don't want to get too much in yo~r face, bt.lt it's kind 
of hard to But I want you to look on this exhibit. 
You •11 see the name "Chdsty" appear here on this 
exhibit. Now.- April testified that Christy is her older 
sin:t.er; and April also testified that mom and 
Nr. Rammell told her that thi!! wa!l pa;rt of he.:r 
inheritance. And this document directly references that 
because .she was at mom's request she was paying .for 
Christy, and the reason she•d be paying Ch:;:isty was 
becau.s:e this her inheritance. That's directly 
consistent with the statement that payments would ceas:e 
upon death because she's continuing to honor what her 
mom asked her to do. But she's not legally required to 
do that. She's doing it. That was the testimony. 
I appreciate your time. There's a lot o.f 
things CoUn:3el .:1aid that I could go hack into. I think 
you've heard the evidence, you 1 ve heard the argu:me-nt 
from us_ Again, on behalf of my client, I appreciate 
your time and energy. Thank you. 
(Closing arguments concluded) 
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You scroll down, you look and see§ ther.e is nothin.g 
listed in this agreement to what wa3 being 
tra:nsfer.red .for business or equipment. So certainly all 
the important provisions ar~nrt in the agreement, all 
the important previsions are missing fr<::nn th.;; agreement 1 
and that.',s why we've heard all this oral testimony abor:t 
what the agreement 
You ~ve heard some testimony about honoring 
Christa • .'!I 1 egacy. counsel suggested that that • s what 
they 1 re trying to do. The only you did11' t he ax 
testimony about that. You heard Counsel 1 s argument 
about that~ that t.hat.rs what they•re tryihg to do. The 
only testimony that I remember in the trial and you 
were here as well came frc:n Linda Pia.tnond Raznick 
abol.lt Christa 1 s legacy and about how Christa would .react 
to what Ken was trying to do. What Christa said to 
Linda was that Ch.~;ista would be rolling over in her 
g::t:ave. So comments about her legacy, the only evidence 
in about that. ).s, she would be. rolling ove.t in her graY~ 
based on what he 1 s tryi11g to do, 
Notv, I wan!:: to talk to yotl just briefly 
about payments ce,asing on death because .April B:eguesse 
did testify clearly that both Ken and Christa told her 
that; and she al:s:o .osaid that they told her it was part 
of her inheritance. And Counsel drew your attention to 
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VILLE COUNT'(, l 
DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, The 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR JNOV OR NEW TRIAL 
The Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through its counsel of record, 
Jeffrey D. Brunson and the firm Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submits the 
following memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants' motion for JNOV or new 
trial. 
INTRODUCTION 
On Apri113, 2012, the jury returned its verdict form in this action. The jury found 
the defendants Christa Beguesse, Inc. (CBI), Kenneth Rarnmell (Rammell), and the 
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Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell (the Estate) (collectively the Defendants) liable for 
fraud and breach of contract and warranty and awarded ABI damages in the amount of 
$544,013.00. The jury found ABI not liable under any of the counterclaims brought by 
the Defendants and awarded the Defendants nothing. As a result, the Defendants filed a 
motion for JNOV to dismiss ABI's claims or alternatively for a new trial. The Defendants 
have waived many of the arguments they are now asserting. Any remaining arguments 
are not supported by the law or facts established in this case. Thus, the Defendants' 
motion should be denied. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Ajnov should not be granted if the jury's verdict has any basis in the facts of the 
case. The Idaho Supreme Court notes that a jnov should only be granted when reasonable 
minds could not have reached the verdict that the jury reached. Watson v. Navistar !nt'l 
Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 829 P.2d 656 (1992). The moving party admits the tmth of 
the adverse evidence and every inference that may be legitimately drawn from it. See, 
e.g., Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,496,943 P.2d 912,922 (1997); 
Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 835 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992); Quick v. Crane, 111 
Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). The trial court does not re-weigh the evidence on a 
motion for jnov; additionally, the court should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses or 
compare any of its own factual findings to those of the jury. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 496, 
943 P.2d at 922. The Court draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.Id. 
A trial judge possesses discretion when ruling on a motion for a new trial. Quick 
v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 766,727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). However, the Court should 
give full respect to the jury's findings. Jd. at 768, 1196. Exercising its discretion "the 
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trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is 
contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear 
weight of the evidence .... " Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665,671,429 P.2d 397,403 
(1967). Cf Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,97 P.3d 428 (2004). The Defendants carry 
the burden of demonstrating to the court that the verdict is not supported by the clear 
weight ofthe evidence. See Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107 
(1999). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Defendants fail to provide proper support for their motion for JNOV 
or for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59( a). 
In framing their arguments for jnov or a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a), the 
Defendants rely upon several improper sources. The Defendants cite to April Beguesse's 
deposition several times throughout their brief in support of their motion for jnov or a 
new trial. However, this deposition, or portions thereof, was never published at trial nor 
was the testimony ever admitted into evidence. This is one of the many great failings by 
the Defendants. In fact, counsel for the Defendants initially began to publish April's 
deposition, but then changed course and withdrew his attempt to publish the deposition. 
Because the deposition was never published, it was never added to the trial record in this 
case, and the Defendants cannot now use it as evidence to support their motion for jnov 
or a new trial. Moreover, even if the deposition is published the testimony is not 
inherently admitted during trial because it is not (a) admitted as documentary evidence 
that the jury could have taken into the jury deliberation room and (b) not trial testimony. 
The Defendants also submitted an affidavit of David Alexander, counsel for the 
Defendants, in support of their motion for jnov or a new trial. However, this is an 
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improper use of an affidavit. Mr. Alexander was not a witness or juror at trial. His 
affidavit is not the type of affidavit contemplated under I.R.C.P. 59( a), which establishes 
the ground for which a new trial can be granted: 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any 
order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Misconduct of the jury. 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justifY the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against the law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. Any motion for a new trial based 
upon any of the grounds set forth in subdivisions 1, 2, 3 or 4 must be 
accompanied by an qfjidavit stating in detail the facts relied upon in 
support of such motion for a new trial. Any motion based on subdivisions 
6 or 7 must set fotih the factual grounds therefor with particularity. On a 
motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open 
the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment. 
IDAHO R. Crv. P. 59( a) (2012) (emphasis added). Mr. Alexander, as counsel for the 
Defendants, is not qualified to testifY about any alleged irregularities, jury misconduct, 
accident or surprise, or newly discovered evidence at the trial as contemplated by I.R.C.P. 
59(a)(7). Furthermore, Mr. Alexander's affidavit consists of vague conclusions and 
incorrect statements regarding the trial record, rather than the factual detail required by 
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(7). 
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Finally, the Defendants fail to meet the high standards demanded of a party 
moving for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants consistently fail to show that the jury's 
verdict had no basis in the facts of the case and that reasonable minds could not have 
reached the same verdict reached by the jury in this case. Therefore, and by drawing all 
inferences in favor of ABI, the Defendants fail to meet their burden under the jnov 
standard. In arguing that a new trial should be granted, the Defendants fail to follow 
I.R.C.P. 59( a) by supporting their arguments with either the kind of affidavit 
contemplated under the rule or by setting forth the factual grounds of its argument with 
particularity. The Defendants also consistently fail to show that the verdict was not 
supported by the clear weight of the evidence and that a new trial would be appropriate. 
Because the Defendants fail to meet their burden under either the jnov standard or 
the standard for granting a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a), the Court should deny the 
Defendants' motion for jnov or a new trial. 
II. ABI's claims are Ripe and ABI properly demonstrated damages. 
The Defendants cite to case law to support their argument that ABI' s claims are 
not right. However, the ripeness cases cited by the Defendants are not implicated here. 
The Defendants cite to Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801,53 P.3d 1217, 1220 
(2002), for the proposition that there is no real cQJ].troversy until a proposed law becomes 
an actual law. Here it is undisputed that a purchase of a business took place. There was a 
real and substantial controversy as to what was sold and the value of what was sold. 
Thus, the ripeness cases cited by the Defendants do not support a finding in this case that 
ABI's claims are not ripe. 
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ABI put on evidence of damages as to all of its claims. Most of this evidence 
came into the trial record without any objection. It is axiomatic that the failure to object 
during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection. As a result, ABI's claims are ripe. 1 The 
Defendants pin their entire damages argument on the asseliion that ABI failed to prove its 
damages. (See Defs.' Mem. Re: JNOV or New Trial at 5-7.) However, ABI presented 
testimony at trial regarding the source of ABI' s damages. April testified about the 
representations made to her by the Defendants about CBI owning the library of files. 
April also testified that she would be unable to sell ABI for the same terms under which 
she had purchased CBI. April fuliher testified that she paid $708,000 to the Defendants 
for CBI, based on the Defendants' representations to her, when the business was in reality 
worth only about $250,000 in 2004. Stephen Martin testified that Rammell and Christa 
had valued CBI at $40,000 in their 1999 estate planning documents. The disparity 
between the Defendants' representations to April and the actual value of the business, as 
set forth in testimony at trial, provide evidence of ABI's damages. Because ABI put on 
adequate evidence of damages, the Defendants' ripeness argument fails. 
The Defendant's conclusory argument that the jury's award is excessive and 
appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice should not even 
be considered by the Court. The affidavit submitted by the Defendants is an affidavit of 
counsel and is not the type of affidavit contemplated by Rule 59( a). In any regard the 
facts are not stated with paliicularity and the Defendants' motion should be denied. 
Idaho courts recognize both the "out-of-pocket" rule in measuring damages and 
the "benefit ofthe bargain" rule. Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616,621,962 P.2d 387, 392 
1 It is somewhat perplexing that on one hand the Defendants argue the claims are not ripe and on the other 
hand they argue the claims are beyond the statute oflimitations. These are plainly inconsistent positions. 
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( 1998). "The underlying principle is that the victim of fraud is entitled to compensation 
for every wrong which is the natural and proximate result of the fraud. The measure of 
damages which should be adopted under the facts of a case is the one which will effect 
such result." I d. The benefit of the bargain rule consists of "the difference between the 
real value of the property purchased and the value which it would have had the 
representations been true." Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 217, 923 
P.2d 456, 462 (1996). 
An award of damages will be upheld "where there is sufficient evidence 
supporting the award." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 
P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009). Damages need only be proven with reasonable certainty. Id. 
"Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude; 
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence of damages from the 
realm of speculation." Id. The amount of damages is for the jury to decide. Dinneen v. 
Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 624, 603 P.2d 575, 579 (1979). "Ultimately, however, it is for the 
trier of fact to fix the amount after determining the credibility of the witnesses, resolving 
conflicts in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom." Griffith, 146 
Idaho at 618,200 P.3d at 1167. On a motion for jnov, the court can only set aside a jury 
award if the damage award "shock[ s] the conscience" of the trial judge. Quick v. Crane, 
Ill Idaho 759, 769-70, 727 P.2d 1187, 1197-98 (1986). 
The Defendants improperly try to impeach the jury verdict. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) absolutely prohibits substantive impeachment of a jury verdict. 
The Idaho appellate courts have consistently upheld the sacrosanct nature of 
deliberations and prohibited impeachment of jury verdicts: "A review of the internal 
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deliberation process of the jury is prohibited unless affected by extraneous prejudicial 
information or an outside influence." Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., 117 Idaho 195, 
198,786 P.2d 586,589 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503,510, 
757 P.2d 1222, 1229 (Ct. App. 1988)). "The reasons for excluding evidence attempting to 
impeach the verdict include insuring the freedom of deliberations, the stability and 
finality of verdicts and the protection of jurors." Lehmkuhl, 114 Idaho at 509. 
The Defendants have not presented any evidence that any outside prejudicial 
force influenced the jury's deliberative process. Thus, any suggestion that the verdict is 
anything other than what it purports to be is improper and contrary to Idaho law. 
The Defendants' argument that the representations regarding the value of the 
proprietary files were statements of opinion and therefore not actionable representations 
is without merit. First, the Defendants do not cite any Idaho law in support of their 
argument. Second, the cases cited by the Defendants actually support ABI's position. 
Third, the argument ignores the representation of ownership of proprietary. Even if the 
statement of value was not actionable fraud, the statement of ownership is. 
April Beguesse testified at trial that she was told by her mother and Rammell that 
she would be getting ownership of a library of files valued between 1-1.3 million dollars 
and that she would be getting proprietary software unique to CBI's business that Christa 
Beguesse had created. April also testified at trial that she relied on the representations as 
to ownership and value. She testified specifically that she relied on Rammell' s 
assessment of value because of his background as an accountant. Linda Raznick's 
testimony at trial provided via deposition was that Thomson Reuters owned the library of 
files and that ABI could not sell or market the library of files to a third party. 
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April testified that because she did not own the files, she was deprived of the 
benefit of the bargain. April testified that because she did not get proprietary software, 
unique to CBI's business that Christa had created, she did not get the benefit of the 
bargain. Based on April's testimony at trial, the value of the files at the time of the deal 
was represented to be between 1-1.3 million dollars. April testified, without any 
objection, that the value of what she actually got was $254,100. Rammell testified that 
the value he and Christa gave their estate planning attorney for CBI was $40,000 and that 
was because the business was not worth anything without Christa. This evidence 
establishes that the jury's finding of damages was well within the permissible range. 
April's testimony was not speculative. The Defendants offered no testimony at 
trial to rebut her testimony as to damages. As such the jury's verdict should not be 
altered and the Defendants' motion should be denied. 
III. The statute of limitations does not bar ABI's claims. 
The statute of limitations issue was thoroughly briefed and argued on summary 
judgment. ABI incorporates and restates that argument and evidence as if fully set forth 
herein. The jury properly determined the statute of limitations issue and the Defendants 
are doing nothing more than trying to get the Court to re-weigh factual issues properly 
decided by the jury. 
In its summary judgment decision, the Court stated "a factual dispute exists" as to 
questions of whether ABI's claims were barred by the statute oflimitations. (Nov. 2, 
2010 Mem. Decision and Order 7.) This issue was a question of fact and was properly 
submitted to the jury. 
a. ABI's claims regarding the library of files are not barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
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The Defendants argue that ABI' s claims regarding the library of files are barred 
by the statute of limitations because April testified that she knew neither CBI nor ABI 
owned the copyrights to the library of files. This is the first of several times in their brief 
that the Defendants mischaracterize April's testimony regarding ownership of the library 
of files. April testified that she knew CBI and ABI did not own the copyright to the final 
published books. April testified, however, that she believed CBI and later ABI owned the 
library of files used to create and update the printed books. April also testified that her 
belief that ABI would own the library of files was significant in her decision to purchase 
CBI. April further testified that she did not learn that ABI did not own the library of files 
until a phone conversation with Linda Raznick after Christa's death, well within the 
statute of limitations. 
b. ABI's claims regarding the proprietary software are not barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
In arguing that ABI' s claims regarding the proprietary software are barred by the 
statute oflimitations, the Defendants improperly cite to April Beguesse's earlier 
deposition. As argued above, counsel for the Defendants failed to publish the deposition 
at trial, so it is not a part of the record and cannot be relied upon by the Defendants in 
their motion for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants failed to elicit the same or 
substantially similar testimony from April during trial. The Defendants simply failed to 
properly use April's deposition during trial and cannot now rely upon the deposition to 
support their motions. 
Furthermore, in making this argument, the Defendants again miscast April's 
testimony. Contrary to what the Defendants argue, April testified that she heard Christa 
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address members of the Exchange Club and state that she had invented a software 
operating program. The fact that April did not hear Christa's later clarification of this 
statement was supported by Stephen Hall's testimony. This evidence indicates that April 
only became aware of the Defendants' fraud within the time period established by the 
statute of limitations. 
The Defendants' argument that ABI' s breach of contract and warranty claims 
against the Defendants accrued upon ABI' s purchase of CBI in 2004 also must fail. The 
jury correctly determined that the Defendants were equitably estopped from arguing that 
ABI's breach claims accrued in 2004 because of the Defendants' fraudulent 
representations. The jury correctly and properly determined that ABI' s breach claims 
against the Defendants were not barred by the statute of limitations. 
c. None of ABI' s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
In arguing that all of ABI's other claims against the Defendants should be barred 
under the statute of limitations, the Defendants rely on their conclusory statement that 
"[t]here simply is no substantial and competent evidence to rule otherwise." (Defs.' 
"~ ·~ Mem. Re: JNOV or New:f'ri~fat 10.) This is not enough. The Defendants have a high .... 
burden to meet in order to successfully move for jnov or for a new trial, and they fail to 
meet their burden under either standard. In drawing all inferences in favor of ABI, as the 
Court must do on a motion for jnov, it is clear the Defendants have failed to show that the 
jury's verdict has no basis in the facts of the case. The Defendants have also failed to 
show that the evidence did not support the jury's determination that none of ABI's claims 
were barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, a new trial would not be appropriate 
under I.R.C.P. 59( a). 
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IV. Counsel for ABI did not make inappropriate arguments during closing 
statements to the jury. 
The Defendants next argue that counsel for ABI made inappropriate closing 
arguments. The Defendants claim ABI' s counsel did this by focusing on matters 
previously rejected by the Court, making arguments not based on evidence presented at 
trial, and inflaming the jury by arguing irrelevant matters. However, the Defendants have 
waived their right to make such an argument. Furthermore, counsel for ABI did not act 
inappropriately in delivering his closing argument to the jury. 
By failing to make a proper objection to ABI's counsel's closing argument at trial, 
the Defendants have waived their right to make any objection. The Idaho Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., in which 
the Court found that the district court erred in granting a new trial based in part on 
statements made by counsel in closing argument: 
The district court likewise erred in finding counsel's statements at trial 
caused an irregularity in the proceedings that unfairly prejudiced the jury 
against Newby-Wiggins. This Court has held that where counsel fails to 
make a proper objection to evidence or testimony offered at trial the issue 
is not preserved for appeal. See, Wheaton v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 
129 Idaho 538, 541, 928 P.2d 42, 45 (1996). Gillingham's counsel 
remarked in closing that should the jury find the State was required to 
indemnify Newby-Wiggins for Gillingham's claim, the result would be 
that Gillingham will recover nothing. Counsel's statement was an 
inaccurate portrayal of Gillingham's recovery, but Newby-Wiggins failed 
to object to the statement during trial. The district court ignored Newby-
Wiggins' waiver of objection and instead granted a new trial. This was 
improper and an insufficient ground to grant a new trial. 
142 Idaho 15,24-25, 121 P.3d 946, 955-56 (2005). Because counsel in the Gillingham 
case failed to object to opposing counsel's inaccurate remarks during the trial, it waived 
any objections. Just as in Gillingham, counsel for the Defendants failed to object to 
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anything said by ABI's counsel during closing argument, and by failing to do so waived 
all objections to anything said during ABI's counsel's closing argument. 
Furthermore, nothing said by ABI's counsel during closing argument was 
inappropriate. The Defendants first accuse ABI' s counsel of focusing on matters 
previously rejected by the Court, specifically that Rammell only contributed $500 to 
become a fifty percent member of CBI, that the jury should find fraud concerning the 
will, and that April had a right to a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group. ABI's 
counsel did not inappropriately allude to any of these issues in his closing statement. 
Evidence that Rammell only contributed $500 to become a fifty percent member 
of CBI came into the record during Rammell' s testimony at trial, and goes to the 
materiality of ABI's claims against the Defendants. In addition, ABI's counsel never 
suggested in his closing argument that the jury should find fraud regarding the will. 
Rather, ABI's counsel instead focused on representations made by the Defendants to 
April that her monthly payments should cease upon Christa's death. Finally, and contrary 
to the Defendants' arguments, counsel for ABI never suggested that April had the right to 
a guaranteed contract with the Rutter Group. This was simply not mentioned during his 
closing argument. 
The Defendants also argue that counsel for ABI improperly argued in closing that 
they defrauded ABI because it would be worth nothing if April died. This is, however, a 
logical extension of earlier testimony given by RammelL Rammell testified that when he 
and Christa were valuing their assets for estate planning purposes, CBI was estimated to 
be worth $40,000, because if Christa died, that was the amount of assets that could be 
liquidated from the business. Rarnmell testified that when he and Christa were engaging 
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in this valuation analysis for estate planning reasons, they determined the business 
wouldn't be worth anything if Christa died. Regardless, there was no objection to any 
statements concerning these arguments. 
With this testimony from Rammell in the record, and other evidence being what it 
is, it only makes sense that ABI, like CBI before it, would lose its value upon the death of 
its owner, April. This argument pertains to the issue of valuation, and counsel for ABI did 
not inappropriately bring it up in his closing argument to the jury. 
Finally, the Defendants make a conclusory statement that counsel for ABI 
inflamed the jury by arguing irrelevant matters in his closing argument, which tainted 
every claim before the jury and urged them to find fraud without any basis in the 
evidence or in the law, and instead agree on a verdict based on passion and prejudice. The 
Defendants offer absolutely no evidence to support this claim. Instead, the circumstances 
suggest that the jury's verdict was based on the evidence of the trial. 
V. The Court should uphold the jury's verdict as to ABI's fraud claims 
against all Defendants. 
a. The jury verdict form was proper. 
The Defendants argue that the jury verdict form was improper because it is 
impossible to determine what specific acts of fraud the jury determined were committed 
by the Defendants. However, the Defendants effectively waived their ability to make this 
argument upon submission of their proposed jury verdict form. Furthermore, the jury 
verdict form was proper in this case. 
On September 9, 2011, the Defendants submitted their proposed special verdict 
form. Several of the questions on the verdict form are substantially identical to the verdict 
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form utilized by the jury. Examples of similar or identical questions include the 
following: 
Did the Defendants commit fraud? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and 
Special Verdict Form, Question 1.) 
Did Kenneth Rammell commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 2.) 
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 3.) 
Did Christa Beguesse commit fraud? (Verdict Form, Question 4.) 
Did the plaintiff know or should it reasonably have known, on or before 
May 7, 2005, that it could not sell the library of files without its 
customer's permission? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form, Question 3.) 
Are Plaintiffs claims of fraud barred by the statute of limitations? 
(Verdict Form, Question 1.) 
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
library of proprietary files? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form, Question 4.) 
Did the defendants breach a warranty with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
library of proprietary files? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form, Question 5.) 
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with 
Plaintiff as to a library of files? (Verdict Form, Question 7.) 
Did the defendants breach a contract with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
proprietary software? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form, Question 7.) 
Did the defendants breach a warranty with plaintiff ABI relating to the 
proprietary software? (Defs.' Proposed Jury Instructions and Special 
Verdict Form, Question 8.) 
Did Christa Beguesse, Inc. breach its contract and/or warranty with 
Plaintiff as to proprietary software? (Verdict Form, Question 1 0.) 
By submitting a proposed jury verdict form that is substantially similar to the 
verdict form utilized by the jury in reaching its verdict, the Defendants have waived any 
objections to the verdict form. 
Furthermore, the jury verdict form is proper. With regards to ABI' s fraud claims 
against the Defendants, it asks whether each defendant individually committed fraud 
against ABI. This is more specific than the Defendants' proposed special verdict form 
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regarding whether the Defendants committed fraud against ABI. The jury verdict form is 
more specific than the Defendants make it out to be, and it sufficiently and properly 
outlined the questions for the jury to answer in delivering its verdict. The Court should 
uphold the jury's verdict on all of ABI's fraud claims against the defendant. 
b. The jury instructions were proper. 
The Defendants also argue that the jury instructions were improper because "[t]he 
jury was allowed to consider fraud on the basis of 'misrepresentations as to the terms of 
the contract.'" (Defs.' Mem. Re: JNOV or New Trial at 11-12.) The Defendants then 
make a confusing argument that a party cannot misrepresent terms while negotiating a 
contract. In stating that the Court erred in giving the jury a blanket and confusing fraud 
instruction, the Defendants do not point out that they failed to submit a proposed jury 
instruction that would fix the alleged failings in the instruction given by the Court to the 
jury. The Defendants effectively waived their ability to argue that the jury instruction 
pertaining to fraud was improper by failing to submit a better alternative in their proposed 
jury instructions. Additionally, the Defendants offer no evidence to show that the jury's 
instruction on fraud was improper. 
c. The evidence supports the amount of damages awarded by the 
jury. 
The Defendants argue that the amount of damages awarded by the jury are not 
supported by the evidence, and that the jury improperly based its damages award on 
ABI's fraud claims related to Christa Beguesse's will. However, in making this 
argument, the Defendants use blatantly incorrect reasoning. 
The Defendants claim that the jury improperly awarded ABI damages for fraud 
based on Christa's will, and that the award was merely a retrial of the probate issue. In 
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arguing this, the Defendants state that "the amount awarded [by the jury for ABI's fraud 
claims] is exactly one-half of the value of the community property as it appears in the 
notes of attorney Stephen Martin." (Defs.' Mem. In Supp. Defs.' Mot. JNOV or New 
Trial12.) This is incorrect. Mr. Martin's notes plainly showed that the value of the 
community property, as estimated by Christa Beguesse and Rammell in 1999, was 
$900,000.00. (See Pl.'s Trial Ex. 44.) The jury awarded ABI $354,000.00 in damages for 
ABI's fraud claims against the Defendants. Contrary to what the Defendants argue, 
$354,000.00 is not half of the $900,000.00 valuation of the community in 1999, and there 
is no indication that the jury based its fraud award on the issue of Christa Beguesse's 
will. 
The Defendants ignore the fact that the jury spent several hours deliberating the 
case's merits. The Defendants' arguments are based solely on supposition. Simply 
arguing that the jury must have awarded damages based on passion or prejudice because 
the verdict was large is insufficient. This is a commercial claim, which by its very nature 
involves significant dollar amounts. There must be some evidence that passion or 
prejudice was involved in this case. The Defendants have no such evidence. 
In arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the amount of damages 
awarded by the jury, the Defendants have failed to meet their burden under either the 
jnov standard or the standard for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a). In drawing every 
inference in favor of ABI, as the Court must do on a motion for jnov, the Defendants 
have failed to show that reasonable minds could not have arrived at the verdict and award 
reached by the jury. The Defendants have also failed to show that the jmy's verdict was 
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not supported by a clear weight of the evidence, as required for a motion for new trial 
under I.R.C.P. 59( a). 
VI. ABI did not fail to prove all the essential elements of fraud. 
The Defendants later argue that ABI failed to prove all the essential elements of 
fraud, specifically that CBI owned a library of proprietary titles valued at over 
$1,000,000; that CBI owned proprietary PageMaker software unique to CBI's business; 
and that Christa had a will that allowed ABI to stop making payments to CBI upon 
Christa's death. In making this argument, the Defendants fail to provide evidence to 
support its argument while ignoring testimony in the record that contradicts its position. 
a. Representations regarding ownership of the library of files. 
The Defendants' argument is based on its mischaracterization of April Beguesse's 
testimony regarding representations made to her by the Defendants concerning ownership 
of the library of files. As established above, April testified at trial that she knew CBI and 
ABI did not own the copyright to the physical books produced by the Rutter Company, 
but she testified repeatedly that she believed she owned the library of files used to create 
and update the finished product. April's belief was supported by her testimony that CBI, 
and later ABI, provided locked versions of the files to the Rutter Group, requiring any 
edits or changes to be made by CBI or ABI. This testimony provided evidence that April 
Beguesse and ABI were in fact ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' representations 
about CBI' s ownership of the library of files. 
It should be noted that April's testimony about her belief regarding the ownership 
of files is undisputed. The Defendants disclosed Pete Masterson as a potential expert 
witness to rebut April's testimony about ownership of the files, but declined to call him at 
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trial. Therefore, April's testimony about ownership of the library of files remains 
undisputed. 
b. Representations regarding the proprietary software. 
In arguing that ABI failed to show it was ignorant of the falsity of the Defendants' 
representations to April that CBI owned proprietary software, the Defendants ignore 
evidence from April's testimony indicating otherwise. April testified that Christa told her 
that she would be getting software, including proprietary software, as part of her purchase 
of CBI. April further testified that she heard Christa tell members at a meeting of the 
Exchange Club that Christa had invented a software operating program. April also 
testified that Rammell concurred with Christa's representations about the proprietary 
software, and that she relied on these representations by Christa and Rammell. April's 
testimony provides evidence that she and ABI were ignorant of the falsity of the 
Defendants' representations regarding the proprietary software. 
c. Representations regarding ABI's payments to cease upon the 
death of Christa. 
The Defendants argue that ABI failed to prove all the essential elements of fraud 
in its attempts to relitigate the issues stemming from Christa's will and decided earlier by 
the probate court. This is a misstatement of ABI' s position- ABI argued that the 
Defendants represented to April that ABI' s payments for the purchase of CBI would 
cease upon Christa's death. The terms of the will are irrelevant to this argument; instead, 
what is relevant are the representations made by the Defendants to April about ABI's 
monthly payments stopping after Christa's death as a pari of ABI's deal to purchase CBI. 
Furthermore, counsel for ABI never urged the jury to rewrite Christa's will in claiming 
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this, the Defendants merely rely on a conclusory statement without any evidence to 
support it. 
In arguing that ABI failed to prove all of the essential elements of fraud, the 
Defendants fail to provide evidence to meet their high burden under the standards for 
granting a motion for jnov or a new trial. The Defendants have failed to demonstrate that 
reasonable minds could not have reached the same verdict as that reached by the jury, 
making the Defendants' motion for jnov inappropriate. The Defendants have also failed 
to show that the jury's verdict was not supported by the clear weight of the evidence, 
making the Defendants' motion for a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a) inappropriate. 
VII. The Court should uphold the jury's verdict as to ABI's fraud claims 
against the Estate. 
The Defendants also argue that ABI 's fraud claims against the Estate must fail for 
a lack of substantial and competent evidence. In making this argument, the Defendants 
ignore several pieces of testimony that came from different sources throughout the course 
of the trial that supported ABI's claims of fraud against the Estate. 
April testified during direct examination that Christa and Rarnrnell told her that 
she would be getting the turnkey business, software, and a library of files worth 1-1.3 
million dollars, which could later fund April's retirement. This testimony came in prior to 
counsel for the Defendants raising an objection under Idaho Code§ 9-202 and Idaho Rule 
of Evidence 601 (b), and before the Court issued its limiting instruction to the jurors. 
Therefore, April's above testimony about representations made in part by Christa about 
the elements of April's purchase of CBI provides substantial and competent evidence of 
fraud on the part ofthe Estate. 
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Later in the trial proceedings, counsel for the Defendants opened the door for 
April to testifY about further representations made by her mother regarding April's 
purchase of CBI. Under cross-examination by counsel for the Defendants, April testified 
that Christa told her the business would belong to April one hundred percent and that 
payments would cease upon Christa's death. This testimony provided further substantial 
and competent evidence supporting ABI's claims of fraud against the Estate. 
Stephen Hall provided further evidence of fraud by the Estate against ABI. Mr. 
Hall testified that he attended the meeting in which Christa addressed the Exchange 
Group. Mr. Hall further testified that he thought Christa said she developed a software 
program or process related to her line of work. He further testified that he thought he 
approached Christa after the presentation and learned that she used off-the-shelf software, 
but that April, who was present at the general presentation, may not have heard Christa's 
answer to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall's testimony provided additional evidence supporting ABI's 
claim of fraud against the Estate. 
Finally, Rammell's testimony provided even more evidence supporting ABI's 
claims of fraud against the Estate. Rammell testified that he and Christa both told April 
that she would be able to sell ABI for the same amount that she paid to Christa and Ken 
for the purchase of CBI. The Defendants argue that any representations made by 
Rammell and Christa to April regarding the valuation of CBI were merely statements of 
opinion rather than statements of fact. In making this argument, the Defendants cite to 
three cases, none of which are Idaho cases. However, should the Court choose to consider 
them, these cases actually support ABI's claims against the Estate by distinguishing that 
false statements by a person with special knowledge of a matter may be actionable: 
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Whenever property of any kind depends for its value upon contingencies 
which may never occur, or developments which may never be made, 
opinion as to its value must necessarily be more or less of a speculative 
character; and no action will lie for its expression, however fallacious it 
may prove, or whatever the injury a reliance upon it may produce ... 
For opinions upon matters capable of accurate estimation by 
application of mathematical rules or scientific principles, such, for 
example, as the capacity of boilers, or the strength of materials, the case 
may be different. So, also, for opinions of parties possessing special 
learning or knowledge upon the subjects in respect to which their opinions 
are given, as of a mechanic upon the working of a machine he has seen in 
use, or of a lawyer upon the title of property which he has examined. 
Opinions upon such matters are capable of approximating the truth, and 
for a false statement of them, where deception is designed, and injury has 
followed from reliance on them, an action may lie. 
Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 558 (1882). 
A statement as to value of property may also be actionable as a fraudulent 
representation of fact under some circumstances, where there is a special 
reliance placed upon it and superior knowledge on the part of the maker. 
In such a case it may also be said that the statement of value when the 
value is known to be different from that stated is a fraudulent 
misrepresentation of an opinion as existing that does not exist. 
Byers v. Federal Land Co., 3 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. Wyo. 1924). 
While these cases are not binding in Idaho, they offer persuasive authority to 
support ABI's claims for fraud against the Estate. Given Christa's extensive experience 
in the typesetting field- a fact that was testified by several witnesses -she had superior 
knowledge about CBI and typesetting, and any representations made by her as to the 
value of CBI should be held to a higher standard. Ultimately, Rammell' s testimony, 
combined with the testimonies of April Beguesse and Stephen Hall, provide substantial 
and compelling evidence to support ABI's fraud claims against the Estate. 
VIII. The Court should uphold ABI's fraud and breach claims against all 
Defendants regarding the library of files. 
a. ABI did not pursue a claim of guaranteed contract at trial. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for JNOV or New Trial- Page 22 484 
The Defendants argue that ABI improperly argued a guaranteed contract claim at 
trial under the guise of ABI' s claims for fraud and breach of contract and warranty 
against the Defendants. However, in making this argument, the Defendants again 
improperly cite April's unpublished deposition, which is not in the trial record. 
Additionally, in claiming that ABI merely reargued its earlier guaranteed contract 
claim that was dismissed by this Court in its summary judgment decision, the Defendants 
ignore the fact that the evidence in question goes to the materiality of the representations 
made by the Defendants to April regarding her purchase ofCBI and the library of files. 
Even the evidence from April's unpublished deposition relied on by the Defendants goes 
to the materiality ofthe Defendants' representations to April. 
In making their argument, the Defendants are overstating the significance of the 
Court's summary judgment decision regarding ABI' s guaranteed contract claim. In its 
decision, the Court ruled simply that the alleged facts did not support a claim for a 
guaranteed contract between ABI and the Rutter Group. (Nov. 2, 2010 Mem. Decision 
and Order 10 ("Thus, the record established that ABI can not prove its ignorance of the 
falsity of the alleged statement regarding a guaranteed contract with Rutter. Defendants 
are entitled to summary judgment dismissing ABI's claim for fraud as it relates to this 
alleged misrepresentation.")) The Court's decision regarding ABI's guaranteed contract 
claim was limited to that particular claim and did not limit ABI' s ability to present 
evidence as to the materiality of the Defendants' representations regarding ownership. 
Finally, contrary to what the Defendants argue, there is no "law of this case" until 
the case is concluded. The Defendants' conclusory statement that "[h]aving heard the 
evidence, judgment for the Defendant is warranted on the law of this case, which is that 
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Plaintiff was aware at the time she entered the contract that she would have no ability to 
control her customer's typesetting choices" is both misleading and confusing. (Defs.' 
Mem. Re: JNOV or New Triall9.) ABI was not trying to pursue its earlier claim of a 
guaranteed contract under different terms, and the evidence referenced by the Defendants 
in attempting that argument instead goes to show the materiality of the defendant's 
representations to April Beguesse regarding ownership ofthe library of files. 
b. ABI established a legal basis for its claims of fraud and breach 
against the Defendants regarding the library of files. 
The Defendants next launch into a confusing litany about ownership rights and 
copyright law. In making their argument that ABI failed to establish a legal basis for its 
claims of fraud and breach of contract and warranty, the Defendants mischaracterize 
exactly what constituted ownership of the files as discussed between April Beguesse and 
the Defendants. In so doing, the Defendants also fail to provide any evidence or authority 
for their argument that ABI had no legal right in the files. 
The question of ownership of the library of files is a fact question, and was 
appropriate for the jury to consider. April testified repeatedly throughout the trial that she 
thought she owned the library of files, and that this ownership belief was significant to 
her. April testified that she thought she owned the files and was free to sell them until her 
conversation with Linda Raznick, during which April learned she did not own the files. 
April further testified that she would not have agreed to the deal had she known that CBI 
did not own the library of files. 
The Defendants again mischaracterize April's testimony about ownership of the 
library of files. April testified throughout the trial that she did not believe CBI had 
ownership of the finished publications- CBI did not own the physical books. April 
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testified instead that the Defendants represented to her that CBI owned the files used to 
create the Rutter Group's finished publications. April testified several times that CBI, and 
later ABI, would send locked versions of the files to the Rutter Group for its review. 
April explained in her testimony that the locked version meant that the Rutter Group 
could not manipulate the file, and any changes or updates had to be made by CBI and 
later ABI. April's testimony in this regard is undisputed. 
This evidence indicates that contrary to what the Defendants argue, ABI had an 
exclusive version of the files and April reasonably believed she owned the files and that 
if the Rutter Group severed ties with ABI, it would have to pay ABI for the files. This 
evidence provides substantial support for the jury's determination on ABI's claims for 
fraud and breach of contract and warranty on the question of the library of files. In 
arguing otherwise, the Defendants ignore the evidence presented at trial. 
IX. The Court should uphold ABI's breach of contract and warranty claim 
against the Defendants. 
The Defendants next argue that April's testimony at trial regarding the terms of 
the contract was vague and irrational. In making this argument, the Defendants don't cite 
to any evidence or testimony in the record supporting this claim. An examination of 
April's testimony contradicts the Defendants' charges that it was vague and irrational. 
April testified consistently during both direct and cross-examination about the 
terms of the agreement between ABI and the Defendants. April testified that Christa told 
her that the business would belong completely to April. April testified that Christa and 
Rammell told her that no one would be able to take the business away from her. April 
also testified that she believed that under the contract, she was paying for the library of 
files, income from the business, and the ability to sell the files later. April testified that 
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she would not have agreed to the deal had she known that CBI didn't own the library of 
files, and that instead ABI would be paying for Christa's mentoring, obsolete computers, 
furniture, and PageMaker. This extensive testimony from April is neither vague nor 
irrational, and it shows that the jury's verdict in favor of ABI was not against the clear 
weight of the evidence at trial. 
The Defendants also cite to the Court's summary judgment decision to argue that 
ABI is precluded from recovery for both its fraud and breach claims against the 
Defendants. However, in doing so, the Defendants completely misapply the Court's 
language in the decision, which addresses the Defendants' counterclaims: 
8. Defendants' Counterclaims 
Defendants also seek summary judgment on their counterclaims seeking 
relief for breach of contract, constructive trust, and injunctive relief. 
Defendants' argument is primarily based on the claim that Plaintiff has 
breached the contract by failing to pay $12,000 a month pursuant to the 
agreement. 
While the evidence established that Plaintiff has stopped making 
the monthly payment, there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the 
non-payment is a breach of contract. If Plaintiff is successful on the fraud 
claim, the contract may be considered void and there would be no breach. 
(Nov. 2, 2010 Mem. Decision and Order 21 (emphasis added).) 
This language by the Court clearly pertains to the Defendants' counterclaims. 
However, the Defendants are attempting to flip the language around to apply it to ABI' s 
claims of fraud and breach against the Defendants. This argument misrepresents the 
Court's language in its summary judgment decision, and the Defendants fail to offer any 
reason why ABI should be precluded from recovery under both its fraud and breach 
claims. 
The Defendants again argue that the jury verdict form was improper and warrant 
an order granting their motion for jnov or a new trial. However, for the reasons argued 
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above, the Defendants have waived any objections by submitting their proposed special 
verdict form, which is substantially similar to the verdict form utilized by the jury. 
Additionally, contrary to the Defendants' argument, Question 8 of the jury verdict form 
does not fail to specifY whether the jury's determination of breach was related to the 
library of files or to a term of the agreement. Question 8, which asks the total amount of 
damages owed to ABI from the Defendants' breach, refers back to Questions 6 and 7 -
both of which address ABI' s claims regarding the library of files. (Verdict Form, 
Question 8.) With that context, Question 8 clearly contemplates ABI's damages 
stemming from its breach claim related to the ownership of the files. The Defendants fail 
to provide any evidence to support its claim that the jury could have awarded damages 
based on a different breach by CBI, because there is no evidence to support this 
argument. 
The Defendants conclude by rehashing their earlier argument that the damages 
awarded by the jury, in this case for ABI's breach of contract and warranty claims against 
the Defendants, were not supported by the evidence. Again, the Defendants fail to 
provide any evidence for this argument. In contrast, the evidence at trial shows that ABI 
presented a range of potential damages valuations, and the jury's award is well within 
this range. And again, the Defendants' argument that the jury must have awarded 
damages based on passion or prejudice rather than on the evidence, merely because the 
verdict was large, is insufficient. In this area, as with their overall arguments throughout 
their brief, the Defendants fail to meet their burden to justifY this Court granting their 
motion for jnov or a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59( a). 
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CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' motion for jnov and a new trial 
should be denied. 
Jeffr 
John . Avondet 
OfBeard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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Case No. CV-09-2767 
On the 5th day of June, 2012, Plaintiff's motion for 
attorney fees and costs and Defendants' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial came before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, by telephonic 
connection in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared for and on behalf of the 
Plaintiff. 
Mr. David Alexander appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Defendant Kenneth Rammell was present at counsel table. 
Mr. Alexander presented Defendants' motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial. Mr. Brunson 
presented argument in opposition to the motion. Mr. Brunson 
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presented Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs. Mr. 
Alexander presented rebuttal argument and argument opposition 
to Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and costs. 
The Court will take the matter(s) under advisement and issue 
a decision as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
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BONNEvaLECOUNTYIDAHO 
April Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
Kenneth Rarnmell, an individual, Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho corporation, TI1e 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its 
qualified personal representative, Kenneth 
Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No.: CV-09-2767 
PLAINTIFF'S ACCEPTANCE OF 
COURT'S REMJTTITUR 
The Plaintiff, April Beguesse, Inc. (ABI), by and through its counsel of record, 
Jeffrey D. Brunson and the firm Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully accepts the 
Court's remittitur outlined in its Order on Motion JNOV or Nevv Trial filed June 11, 2012 
and further clarified in its Supplemental Order on Motion For New Trial filed June 12, 
2012. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
vs. ORDER ON MOTION FOR JNOV OR 
NEW TRIAL 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative a new trial. 
I. PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff April Beguesse, Inc., (ABI) brought this action seeking to recover for 
fraud and breach of contract in the purchase of a business from Defendant Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., (CBI). CBI counterclaimed for breach of contract in failing to make 
payments pursuant to the purchase agreement. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a 
verdict finding that CBI breached its contract and that Defendants committed fraud. The 
jury further denied CBI recovery on its counterclaim. 
I. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
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In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the law 
provides that "a jury verdict must be upheld if there is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of 
the jury." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276, 287 
(2008) (citing Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 15, 20, 
121 P.3d 946, 951 (2005)). In making the motion, a defendant admits the truth of all of 
the plaintiffs' evidence and every legitimate inference. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 
249,252-53, 678 P.2d 41,44-45 (1984). 
Whether that evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact is for the court to 
determine. Furthermore the question is not whether there is literally no evidence 
supporting the jury verdict, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which the jury 
could properly find a verdict for that party. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 
736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974). Accordingly, the trial judge does not weigh the 
evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses and make his own separate findings of 
fact and compare them to the jury's findings as he would in deciding on a motion for a 
new trial. Quick v. Crane 111 Idaho 759, 763-764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 - 1192 (1986). 
With regard to a motion for new trial, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59( a) states 
that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues in an action for ... " (1) irregularity in the proceedings/abuse of discretion, (5) 
excessive damages, (6) Insufficiency ofthe evidence/against the law, and (7) error in the 
law. 
In considering an allegation of excessive damages, the trial court is to weigh the 
evidence and then compare the jury's award to what he would have given had there been 
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no jury. If the trial judge discovers that his determination of damages is so substantially 
different from that of the jury that he can only explain this difference as resulting from 
some unfair behavior such as "passion or prejudice," then the court should grant a new 
trial. The disparity in damages should "shock the conscience" of the trial judge or lead 
him to conclude that it would be "unconscionable" to let the damage award stand as the 
jury set it. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725 (Mont.l984); Mamma v. State, 
138 Ariz. 528,675 P.2d 1347 (1983). Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 
(1986). 
A motion based upon subdivision 6 must "set forth the factual grounds therefore 
with particularity." I.R.C.P. 59( a). 
A trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where 
"after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of 
the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes the verdict is not in accord 
with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." The trial court is 
given broad discretion in this ruling. The trial judge may set aside the 
verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it. In addition, 
the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict-winner. Addressing the considerable discretion 
given to the trial court in deciding motions for new trials, this Court has 
said: 
"[t]he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the 
verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is 
convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by 
vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or 
justice." 
Furthermore, "[i]f having given full respect to the jury's findings, the 
judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a 
new trial." 
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428,435 (2004) 
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After a trial court assesses the credibility of the witnesses and weighs the 
evidence, the court may grant a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence if 
the court determines that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence and that a 
different result would follow a retrial. Hudelson v. Delta Jnt'l Mach Corp., 142 Idaho 
244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005); O'Shea v. High Mark Development, LLC 2012 WL 
1436898, 13 (Idaho,2012). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Motion for JNOV. 
Defendants ask the court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict 
dismissing ABI's claim. Defendants argue that the verdict is unsupported by the 
evidence and contrary to law. First, the Court finds that there was no error in the 
application of the law to the claims made. Second, the Court finds that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict with the exception of the claim against the 
Estate of Christa Beguesse. 
In its verdict, the jury determined that ABI was entitled to recover against the 
Estate by reason of fraud. However, pursuant to Rule 601, IRE, the jury was instructed 
that the testimony of April Beguesse could not be considered as evidence supporting a 
claim against the Estate. Jury Instruction No. 21. Absent the testimony of April, there is 
no testimony or evidence of any statement made by Christa to April which would satisfy 
the elements of fraud. 
Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support a fraud claim against the 
Estate, and that claim should be dismissed. The remainder of Defendants' motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. 
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B. Motion for New Trial. 
Defendants based their motion for new trial on Rule 59( a), subdivisions (1) 
irregularity in the proceedings and/or abuse of discretion, (5) excessive damages, (6) 
Insufficiency of the evidence and/or the verdict being against the law, and (7) error in the 
law. In considering the evidence and course of trial, the Court finds that there was no 
irregularity in the proceedings or error in the law entitling Defendants to a new trial. 1 
As to allegedly excessive damages, the amount of damages this Court would have 
awarded does vary from the damages awarded by the jury. April testified that ABI paid 
$708,000 to CBI yet she thought that the business was only worth $254,100 when 
considering the fraud and breach of contract. The measure of damages would then be 
$453,900. It is the Court's opinion that this testimony by April set out the maximum 
amount of recovery available to ABI. As such, the Court finds the jury award of damages 
in excess of that amount to be inexplicable and based on passion and prejudice. 
There was testimony that for purposes of estate planning some years prior to the 
sale of the business to ABI, Christa and/or Rammell advised the estate planning attorney 
that the value of the business was $40,000. It is the Court's opinion that reliance upon 
the $40,000 figure would not be reasonable, but rather would be against the clear weight 
of the evidence and particularly April's own testimony. As such, the Court finds that the 
ends of justice would be served by granting a conditional new trial. 
Specifically, Rule 59.1, IRCP allows for a new trial conditioned upon the 
acceptance of a remittitur. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants would be 
1 There is no basis for the Estate to seek a new trial inasmuch as the claim against the Estate will be 
dismissed pursuant to the Estate's motion for jnov. 
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entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages unless Plaintiff accepts a remittitur in the 
amount of$90,113, resulting in ajudgment of$453,900. 
In considering the evidence presented at trial, the Court is of the opinion that the 
evidence would have supported a finding in favor of ABI or Defendants, depending on 
whom the jury believed. Again, the credibility of witnesses was a critical factor. The 
jury's determinations finding liability against CBI and Rammell in favor of ABI are 
supported by substantial evidence and are not against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The Court does not believe a new trial on these issues would result in a different 
outcome. As such, Defendants are not entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is granted in part and denied in part, as set out above. Defendant's motion for 
new trial is granted in part and denied in part, as set out above. Plaintiff shall have 42 
days from the entry of this order to accept a remittitur. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _I{_ day of June, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _jJ_ day of June, 2012, I did send a true and correct 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
vs. SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
In its Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, this Court conditionally granted a 
new trial on the issue of damages subject to Plaintiff accepting a remittitur in the amount 
$90,113. For purposes of clarification, the remittitur only applies to the damages assessed 
against CBI. For example, if Plaintiff accepted the remittitur, total damages assessed 
against Rammell would remain at $354,000, while the total damages assessed against 
CBI would be reduced to $453,900. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this I Lday of June, 2012. 
"'-'-'-""_,"'-'E. TINGEY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By )11~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, ll-.J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
Case No. CV -09-2767 
vs. ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/Counterclaimant. 
This matter has come before the Court upon Plaintiff's motion for costs and 
attorney fees. Defendants have objected to the motion. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants seek an award of costs pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P. and an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3). Section 12-120(3) allows for an award of 
attorney fees in actions "to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction ... ". 
While Plaintiff may have requested attorney fees pursuant to the contract between 
the Parties for purchase of the business, there is no evidence that the oral purchase 
contract contained an attorney fee provision. 
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In considering a motion for costs and fees, the Court is granted broad discretion in 
determining a prevailing party. Rule 54(d)(l)(B) provides as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine 
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in 
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
1. COSTS 
The Court has considered the claims made in this matter, the progress of the 
litigation, and the ultimate outcome. The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing party 
as against Defendants Kenneth Rammell and Chirista Beguesse, Inc. Based on the 
record, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right 
(Rule 54( d)(l )(C)) in the amount of $2,409.29, as against said Defendants, jointly and 
severally. 
2. ATTORNEY FEES 
Under§ 12-120(3), attorney fees are recoverable when the action arises from a 
contract or commercial transaction. 
A "commercial transaction" is defined in Section 12-120(3) as "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I d. An 
award of attorney fees under this section is proper "if the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 
Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007) (quoting Brower v. E.l DuPont 
De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990)). 
BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 
851 (2008) (emphasis added); See also Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 
32, 105 p .3d 676, 692 (2005). 
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In this case, all claims were based on a purchase agreement between Plaintiff and 
CBI for an ongoing business. The Court finds that attorney fees are awardable under § 
12-120(3). 
The Court has reviewed the record and Plaintiffs memorandum of fees and costs. 
The Court has further considered the factors set out in Rule 54(e)(3), I.R.C.P., including 
but not limited to the time required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, prevailing rates 
for attorney fees, the amount in dispute, and duplication of effort. When considering 
those factors, the Court finds that the claim for attorney fees should be discounted 
somewhat. 
Additionally, it is the Court's opinion that the amount of attorney fees should be 
tempered inasmuch as Plaintiff should not recover attorney fees incurred in prosecuting 
the claim against the Estate, since the Court dismissed that claim. Furthermore, it 
appears to the Court there was at least some overlap between attorney fees incurred in 
this action and fees incurred in the separate probate proceedings. Finally, certain 
discovery and other matters pursued by Plaintiff did not materially contribute to Plaintiff 
prevailing in this matter. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to 
an award of attorney fees in the amount of $85,000. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record and the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs motion for costs and 
fees is granted. As against Kenneth Rammell and CBI, Plaintiff is awarded $2,409.29 in 
costs and $85,000 in attorney fees. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this J1_ day of June, 2012. 
DISTRICT JUDGE v 
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I hereby certify that on this Ji day of June, 2012, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BeiNNEvlt£E.)9 




KENNETH RAMMELL, an individual, 
CHRISTA BEGUESSE, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation, THE ESTATE OF CHIRISTA 
BEGUESSE RAMMELL, by it qualified 
personal representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendants/ Counterclaimant. 
Case No. CV-09-2767 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
'{ 
The jury having entered a verdict in this matter, and the Court having entered its 
order on Defendants' motion for jnov or new trial, and Plaintiff have accepted the Court's 
remittitur, and the Court having entered its order on Plaintiffs motion for costs and 
attorney fees, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff shall have judgment 
against Defendants Kenneth Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., joint and several, in 
the amount of $354,000. Plaintiff shall also have judgment against Defendant Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., in the additional amount of $99,900 for a total of $453,900. Plaintiff 
shall also have judgment against Defendants Kenneth Ran1mell and Christa Beguesse, 
Inc., for costs in the amount of $2,409.29, and attorney fees in the amount of $85,000. 
Resulting in a totaljudgment of$ 541,309.29 as to ChristaBeguesse, Inc., and 
$441,409.29 as to Kenneth Rammell, with interest accruing thereon at the statutory rate. 
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AMENDEDJUDGMENT-1 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's claim against the 
Estate of Christa Beguesse is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this ICJ day of June, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this } q day of June, 2012, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upo~ parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
David E. Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
AMENDEDJUDGMENT-2 
Clerk of the District Court 




W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1629) 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-13 91 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its ) 




Case No. CV-09-2767 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., AND ITS 
ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that: 
1. The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on Jury Verdict in the above-entitled action on the 
17th day of April, 2012, and the Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 12th day of June, 
2012, the Honorable Joel B. Tingey presiding, and subsequent supplemental Orders and Judgments. 
2. The Appellants, Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., have a right of 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 506 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are 
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on all claims against Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc.; 
b. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant new trial on all claims against 
Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., and the counterclaim of Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., against Plaintiff-Respondent; 
c. Whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were in error or contrary to law; 
d. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant directed verdict as to Count 3 of the 
Complaint, and all claims for fraud against the Defendants; 
e. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rick Trulson; 
f. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Plaintiffs Exhibit 27a and examination of 
the Defendant thereon; 
g. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury on Plaintiffs 
claims; 
h. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question 
1 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute oflimitations; 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question 
6 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute oflimitations; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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J. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question 
9 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations; 
k. Whether the Court erred in admitting the testimony of April Beguesse in violation 
ofldaho Code§ 9-202; 
1. Whether the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Appellant requests the preparation of a reporter's transcript. The appellant requests 
the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in [X] hard copy []electronic 
fonnat [ ] both (check one): The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25, I.A.R. 
supplemented by the following: Voir dire examination of jury, closing arguments of counsel, 
conferences on requested instructions, arguments on motion for directed verdict. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's) 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All requested and given 
jury instructions; Appellants' motion for directed verdict and briefs submitted therewith; 
Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial, 
and briefs and exhibits submitted therewith. 
7. The appellant requests the following documents, chmis, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 
2, 7, 9, 14, 27a, and 45; Defendants' Exhibits A and B. 
5. I certifY: 
(a) 
(b) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
That the reporter of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
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preparation of the transcript; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012. 
RACINE OLSON NYE 
\ BUDGE& BAILEY 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (j_/iy of July, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
[~U.S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ Hand Delivery 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




Case No. CV-2009-2767 
Docket No. 
KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 


























THE ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE 
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal 
representative, Kenneth Rammel!, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: CV-2009-2767 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment Upon Verdict, entered April 18, 20 12; Supplemental Order 
on Motion for New Trial; Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, entered June 12, 2012; Order on 
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, entered June 19, 2012; and Amended Judgment, entered June 19, 
2012 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 1 
David Alexander, RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE BAILEY 
PO Box 1391, Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Jeffrey Brunson, BEARD ST.CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Kenneth Rammell and Christa Beguess, Inc. 
April Beguess, Inc. 
July 20, 2012 511 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was Reporter's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: July 30, 2012 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 2 
Yes 
Yes 
Jack Fuller, no estimate in file 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
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W. Marcus W. Nye (ISB#: 1 
David E. Alexander (ISB#: 4489) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, 
BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-61 01 
Fax: (208)232-61 09 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 






Kenneth Rammell, an individual, Christa , ) 
Beguesse, Inc., an Idaho Corporation. ) 
Estate of Christa Beguesse Rammell, by its ) 




Case No. CV -09-2767 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, APRIL BEGUESSE, INC., AND ITS 
ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that: 
1. The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named Respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered on Jury Verdict in the above-entitled action on the 
17th day of April, 2012, and the Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 12th day of June, 
2012, the Honorable Joel B. Tingey presiding, and subsequent supplemental Orders and Judgments. 
2. The Appellants, Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., have a right of 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1 
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appeal to the Idaho Supreme urt, and the judgments or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are 
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to 
asseti in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on all claims against Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc.; 
b. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant new trial on all claims against 
Kenneth J. Rammell and Christa Beguesse, Inc., and the counterclaim of Christa 
Beguesse, Inc., against Plaintiff-Respondent; 
c. Whether the trial court's instructions to the jury were in error or contrary to law; 
d. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant directed verdict as to Count 3 of the 
Complaint, and all claims for fraud against the Defendants; 
e. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Rick Trulson; 
f. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Plaintiff's Exhibit 27 a and examination of 
the Defendant thereon; 
g. \Vhether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury on Plaintiff's 
claims; 
h. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question 
1 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations; 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings ofthe jury as to Question 
6 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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J. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the jury as to Question 
9 of the Verdict Form, regarding the statute of limitations; 
k. Whether the Court erred in admitting the testimony of April Beguesse in violation 
of Idaho Code § 9-202; 
1. Whether the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Plaintiff 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) Appellant requests thepreparationofareporter's transcript. The appellant requests 
the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript in [X] hard copy []electronic 
format [ ] both (check one): The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25, I.A.R. 
supplemented by the following: Voir dire examination of jury, closing arguments of counsel, 
conferences on requested instructions, arguments on motion for directed verdict. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's (agency's) 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: All requested and given 
jury instructions; Appellants' motion for directed verdict and briefs submitted therewith; 
Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, for New Trial, 
and briefs and exhibits submitted therewith. 
7. The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: Plaintiffs Exhibits 1, 
2, 7, 9, 14, 27a, and 45; Defendants' Exhibits A and B. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter, Jack 
Fuller; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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(b) That the repor1er of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcript; 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid; 
(d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2012. 
RACINE OLSON NYE 
BUDGE& E 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
516 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
""'<;.I--I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _H day of August, 2012, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Jeffrey D. Brunson 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter 
Bonneville County Courthouse 
605 N. Capitol Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
[XU. S.Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
~ U.S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
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0 ( I 
Jack L . Fuller , CSR 
Offic ial Court Repor t er 
Seventh Judicial District 
Bonnevill e Cou nty Courthouse 
605 N Capital Ave 
Idaho Fal ls , Idaho 83402 
(208) 529-1350 Ext. 1138 
E-Mail: jfuller@co . bonneville .id . us 
******************************************************** 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
******************************************************** 
DATE: November 20 , 2012 
TO: Stephen W. Kenyon , Clerk of the Court 
Supreme Court I Court of Appeals 
P . O. Box 83720 
Boi se, ID 83720-0101 
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO : 40212 
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO: CV-09-2767 (Bonneville County) 
CAPTION OF CASE: April Beguesse , Inc . vs . Kenneth 
Rammell , et al 
You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate 
transcript in the above - entitled and numbered case has 
been lodged with the District Court Cl e rk of the County 
of Bonneville i n the Seventh Judicial District . Sa i d 
transcript consists of the following: 
cc: 
1 . Jury Trial (April 10 - 13, 2012) 
Respec tfully , 
--~~-~--~---------
JACA . FULLER 
Idaho CSR . #76 2 
District Court Clerk 5 18 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 




THE ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE 
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal 
representative, Kenneth Rammell, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 





















Case No. CV-2009-2767 
Docket No. 40212 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District Court ofthe Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination: 
please see attached sheets: 
Exhibit List- April I 0, 2012 
I. Exhibit 7: Letter to The Rutter Group from Chrita Buguesse, dated January 7, 20 II 
2. Exhibit 9: Letter to The Rutter Group from Christ Beguesse, dated December 22, 2003 
3. Exhibit 14: ABI Codes 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- 1 
5lfJ 
4. Exhibit 2: Lease Agreement effective January 1, 2004 
5. Exhibit B: 2004 Cash Flow Statement for April Beguesse 
6. Exhibit A: List of Publications by The Rutter Group 
7. Exhibit 1 : ABI Payment Ledger 
8. Exhibit 45: S. Martin handwritten notes 
9. Exhibit 27a: Christa Burgesse 2000 K-1 tax schedule 
And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this 281h day of December, 2012. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 




THE ESTATE OF CHRIST A BEGUESSE 
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal 
representative, Kenneth Rammel], 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 





















Case No. CV-2009-2767 
Docket No. 40212 
AMENDED CLERK'S 
CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk ofthe District Court of the Seventh Judicial District ofthe State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its determination: 
please see attached sheets: 
Exhibit List April I 0, 2012 
1. Exhibit 7: Letter to The Rutter Group from Chrita Buguesse, dated January 7, 2011 
2. Exhibit 9: Letter to The Rutter Group from Christ Beguesse, dated December 22, 2003 
3. Exhibit 14: ABI Codes 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- I 
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4. Exhibit 2: Lease Agreement effective January 1, 2004 
5. Exhibit B: 2004 Cash Flow Statement for April Beguesse 
6. Exhibit A: List of Publications by The Rutter Group 
7. Exhibit 1: ABI Payment Ledger 
8. Exhibit 45: S. Martin handwritten notes 
9. Exhibit 27a: Christa Burgesse 2000 K-1 tax schedule 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as exhibits to the record: 
1. Transcript: Deposition of Kenneth Rammell, Volume I, taken December 17, 2009 
2. Transcript: Deposition of Kenneth Rammell, Volume II, taken December 18, 2009 
3. Transcript: Deposition of Linda Diamond Raznick, taken June 30, 2009 
(The transcript of the Deposition of Linda Raznick was not located in the file; a copy was 
obtained from Jeffrey Brunson) 
4. Transcript: CV-09-1682 Probate Hearing, held August 4, 2011 
And I further certifY that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
this 1st day ofMay, 2013. 
AMENDED CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- 2 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 




THE EST ATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE 
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal 
representative, Kenneth Rammel!, 
Defendant/Counterclaimant. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
























Case No. CV-2009-2767 
Docket No. 4021 2 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certifY that the above and foregoing Record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 ofthe Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certifY that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will be duly 
lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE- 1 
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the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District Court this 
28111 day ofDecember, 2012. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE- 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




KENNETH RAMMEL, an individual, 




THE ESTATE OF CHRISTA BEGUESSE 
RAMMELL, by it qualified personal 






















Case No. CV-2009-2767 
Docket No. 40212 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ._Jli} day of January, 2013, I served a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
David Alexander 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE BAILEY 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Jeffrey Brunson 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
RONALD LONGMORE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -1 
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